Marine Corps Vietnam
Tankers Historical Foundation®
Marine
Corps Tankers and Ontoscrewmen Have Made History. Your Foundation is Making it Known.
The M50a1 Ontos
The Ontos Anti-Tank
Vehicle.
©2001 Peter Brush
By any measure, the Ontos was one of the most interesting
“things” to come down the road of United States military armored
development. The idea for this vehicle was born in the aftermath
of World War II when the U.S. Army perceived the need for a new
reconnaissance vehicle. Then it evolved into a tank destroyer
for use with the Army on the nuclear battlefields of Europe.
Next it was deployed in Marine Corps anti-tank (AT) battalions.
The Ontos most significant contribution was in the Vietnam War,
but in a role much different from the role for which it was
designed. This is the story of the Ontos, officially the “Rifle,
Multiple 106mm, Self-Propelled, M50.”
The adaption of the internal combustion engine to warfare
brought about the removal of the horse from the battlefield. The
reconnaissance mission formerly performed by cavalry remained.
By the end of World War II, the motorcycle, jeep, armored car,
and light tank all tried to fill the gap, all without complete
success. A classified 1953 U.S. Army report noted:
“There
is an urgent and immediate need in our army for a vehicle
similar in performance to the jeep, but at the same time
affording some armored protection and greater cross-country
mobility, for use by reconnaissance personnel, commanders,
messengers, and liaison officers who are frequently exposed to
small arms fire.”
At that time jeeps and half-tracks were authorized in the
command, scout, and support elements of the Army reconnaissance
platoon. The Ontos was considered as a replacement. After
considerable study the Army concluded that although the vehicle
had outstanding cross-country mobility and armor protection, it
had deficiencies in the areas of storage space, lack of speed,
lack of range, and excess weight. Ironically, given the
vulnerability of the M50 to enemy mines in Vietnam, the Army
concluded these test vehicles “offered protection against atomic
bombing.” The Army decided to stick with its M38A1 ¼ ton trucks
and M21 mortar carriers for reconnaissance platoon use. Spurred
by Secretary Frank Pace, Jr., the Army was developing the Ontos
as a family of vehicles, to include infantry carrier, antitank
antiaircraft, self propelled artillery and logistics carrier.
During World War II, the Army embraced the tank destroyer
concept, which called for the placement of large-caliber
anti-tank guns on lightly armored carriages. These could quickly
be moved to any area under enemy tank threat. This concept was
never embraced by the Marine Corps to any extent. The tank
remained the favored anti-tank weapon for the Marines in the
immediate postwar period. In addition to duties as naval
infantry, postwar planners envisioned a role for the Corps in
any European conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Late 1940s war
planning put the Marines into direct conflict with front-line
units of the Red Army. In the Pacific War the Marines dealt with
sporadic attacks by small Japanese tanks. In the future war
Marine tankers would have to face a highly mechanized Soviet
force equipped with large numbers of medium and heavy tanks.
Using tanks to destroy enemy tanks proved less than satisfactory
in the Korean War: too often the weight of American medium tanks
rendered them too road bound. Marine planners, cognizant of the
formidable threat posed by Communist armor, returned to the
World War II tank destroyer concept. In 1949 the USMC Armor
Policy Board specifically noted “There is a requirement for a
destroyer-type tank to destroy hostile heavily armored
vehicles….”
As early as 1944, Army production and logistics considerations
began to determine Marine Corps tank decisions. Although some of
the USMC armor requirement was developed and produced by the
Navy’s Bureau of Ships (e.g., amphibious tractor or amtracs),
the Corps came to fully depend on the Army for its tank
procurement. In 1951, based on an Army initiative, Allis
Chalmers became the lead contractor for this new anti-tank
vehicle. It would be built at the company’s La Porte, IN,
factory.
In 1953, Michigan Congressman Gerald R
Ford held congressional hearing for Army appropriations. When
discussion turned to anti-tank capabilities, the testimony of
Army generals was taken off the record and not included in the
printed transcript. The public became aware of Ontos development
only by mistake. According to a report in the
New York Times
dated June 26, 1953, the congressional
testimony was classified “Secret”. The newspaper noted “An
entirely new weapons-carrying vehicle, nicknamed ‘The Thing’ but
carrying the official designation Ontos, to be used variously,
including as a mount for a new ‘highly-powered’ recoilless rifle
and for a quadruple .50 calibre antiaircraft weapon against low
flying planes.’ Army officials expressed amazement and appeared
appalled when copies of the 1,667-page printed testimony
released by the subcommittee reached the Pentagon.
The first production model of the M-50 came off the assembly
line on 31 October 1956. The original Ontos emphasized firepower
over crew comfort. The hull was derived from the T55/T56 series
of tracked armored personnel carriers. It was powered by a six
cylinder in-line gasoline engine, the General Motors SL 12340,
which developed 145 horsepower at 3,400 rpm (this was later
upgraded to a Chrysler V-8). This power source was coupled to a
XT-90-2 transmission, which drove the front sprockets, which
turned the tracks. Maximum road speed was 30 mph on improved
roads. The Ontos had terrain navigation ability superior to
tanks. Range was 190 miles on primary roads, 120 miles on
secondary roads, and 50 miles cross country with a 47 gallon
internal fuel tank. With fording kit installed the vehicle could
cross streams as deep as 60 inches. The vehicle weighed nine
tons. It had a three man crew: driver, loader, and gunner. For a
tracked vehicle it made little noise. Consequently, there was no
intercom between the gunner and driver, although there was a
loudspeaker on the radio. The M-50 was not portable by an
available helicopter although it could be air transported by R4Q
aircraft. Two Ontos could be landed over the beach in a LCM-6
(Landing Craft, Mechanized). The M-50 could climb a 60 percent
grade climb over a 30-inch obstacle. The engine would run wet,
and the vehicle could ford two feet of water in normal
configuration. With fording equipment it could go deeper.
The main weapon consisted of six 106mm M40A1C recoilless rifles
mounted on a central turret. The guns extended beyond the hull
on both sides. Built with simplicity in mind, this rifle was the
same weapon used by infantry on a fixed mount. These guns could
be fired individually, in pairs, or all at once. Fifty caliber
spotting rifles were mounted on four of the recoilless rifles.
Two of the recoilless rifles were equipped with a spotting rifle
and sight and could be removed from the vehicle for use on
ground mounts (these spotting rifles could not be fired from
inside). The sights and could be removed from the vehicle for
use on ground mounts. The Ontos also had a .30 caliber machine
gun. Each vehicle carried a normal load of 18 rounds of 106mm
ammunition (six in the rifles plus a dozen more in the ammo
bin). These weapons were externally and coaxially mounted and
were fired electrically. The rate of fire was four aimed rounds
per minute with all guns loaded and fired individually.
The trajectories of the spotting rounds and the 106mm rounds
were very similar to a distance of 1,100 yards. Beyond 1,100
yards the trajectories differed, causing the effectiveness of
this spotting system to decrease as range increased. The
spotting rifle could not be used beyond 1,500 yards,
necessitating the use of burst-on- target and bracket techniques
of fire adjustment at these greater ranges. High Explosive
Anti-Tank (HEAT) ammunition for the 106mm rifle would penetrate
the armor of any known tank (16” of armor at 0 degrees
obliquity). The Ontos’ armor was one-half inch plate except for
the floor, which was only 3/16” inch thick. The upper sloped
armor would withstand all small arms fire, but was vulnerable to
.50 caliber armor piercing rounds. Artillery airbursts could
cause severe damage to the Ontos’ guns and external fire control
equipment.
Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army during the Truman
administration, initially supported the M50 for Army use. Pace
noted, “If Ontos is there, tanks had better get the hell off the
battlefield.” Not everyone agreed with Pace. Others felt it was
too lightly armored, underpowered, and incapable of sustained
combat. The Marine Corps accepted the Ontos after the Army
rejected it. The Marines did not have the specialized supply and
maintenance capabilities of the Army, and the Ontos was a simple
vehicle. It had fewer parts than other armored vehicles. There
was no heavy turret. The engine was a common truck engine found
on various military and civilian vehicles. The fire control
system was simple: according to LtCol. E.L. Bale, Jr., a Marine
instructor at the Army Armor School, the average Marine could
master the system “as easily as he has the pinball machine in
the local drug store.” The Corps ordered 13 million dollars
worth, about 300 vehicles. Production was to run for about one
year.
The Ontos, manned by infantrymen, was quickly integrated into
regimental anti-tank companies. These companies contained 12
Ontos, five officers, And 91 enlisted men. Each unit consisted
of three Ontos platoons of four vehicles each. The unit’s 72
anti-tank rifles could be fired from the vehicle or dismounted
and fired from ground mounts. Its first non-training deployment
abroad came in July 1958. The Lebanon Crisis saw Marine
Battalion Landing Teams (BLT) of the Navy’s Sixth Fleet come
ashore to stabilize the weak Lebanese national government. This
2nd Provisional Marine Force included 15 M48 tanks, 10 Ontos,
and 31 LVTP5 amtracks (Landing Vehicle, Tracked). These vehicles
provided general Force security and protection for armored
patrols until a larger Army tank force could be sent from
Germany. The Marines began reembarkation in mid-August.
The Ontos next saw action in 1965 in the Caribbean. In April the
Dominican Republic was sliding into civil war as reformers did
battle with right-wing military forces. The 6th Marine
Expeditionary Unit, the Caribbean quick-reaction force, was
ordered to ashore in order to evacuate civilians and reinforce
security at the American embassy. A company each of tanks and
amtracs (LVTs) plus two platoons of Ontos were part of the
landing team, which took the side of the Dominican military.
Ontos were organized in the Marine Division into Anti-Tank
Battalions. Each battalion was composed of one headquarters and
service company plus three anti-tank companies. Each of these
letter companies contained three platoons of five Ontos for a
total of 45 Ontos vehicles per battalion. Planned distribution
in the Marine Division was for a company of 15 Ontos (three
platoons) for each of the division’s three infantry regiments.
Ontos companies, along with tanks and amtracs, landed with the
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang, Vietnam, in the
first half of 1965. Within one year, both the 1st and 3rd
Anti-Tank Battalions were ashore in Vietnam. Unlike the enemy in
the Korean War, the Vietnamese Communist military forces
possessed significant anti-armor capabilities in the form of
recoilless rifles and rock propelled grenades. The Ontos’ thin
floor armor (3/16”) made it especially vulnerable to mines.
Consequently, and as opposed to its designed role, Ontos spent a
great portion of their time in static defense positions.
Initially Ontos units were deployed in
defense of the Da Nang airfield. In August, 1965, the Marines
began Operation Starlite,
the first big battle of the war. At 0730 on August 17, tanks and
Ontos rolled off amphibious landing craft (LCUs and LCMs) and
made their way ashore south of Chu Lai in support of the assault
companies. Later in the day a Marine armored column was halted
when a M-48 tank was hit with recoilless rifle fire. The Viet
Cong (VC) poured mortar and small arms fire into the Marine
positions, quickly killing five and wounding 17. The Ontos
maneuvered to provide frontal fire and flank protection until
enemy fire let up. The following month, in
Operation Golden Fleece,
a combined infantry-armor assault force including Ontos attacked
a VC main force unit trying to collect a rice tax in a
Vietnamese village near Da Nang. The enemy was forced to break
contact and flee the area.
After establishing themselves at Da
Nang and Chu Lai, the Marines built their third base at Phu Bai,
in Thua Thien Province 35 miles northwest of Da Nang. Initially,
defense of Phu Bai was provided by the 2nd Battalion, 1st
Marines (Reinforced) which had a platoon of M50s attached. It
was not only the Marines who were expanding their forces in the
northern part of South Vietnam: both the VC and North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) also increased their forces, and both sides sustained
heavy casualties. In late June, on
Operation Jay,
a large, heavily armed VC force ambushed a South Vietnamese
Marine Corps convoy moving north on Route 1, the main
north-south highway in Vietnam. At 0830 hours on June 29, the
attacking force struck the convoy with mortar and recoilless
rifle fire, quickly hitting ten trucks. U.S. Marines quickly
sent reinforcements, including Ontos, to assist the SVN Marines.
The VC force lost interest and tried to break contact. While
crossing open ground, the M50 platoon opened fire and
“obliterated a VC squad on a ridgeline with a single 106mm
salvo.” A M50 platoon commander even captured an enemy soldier.
Over 185 enemy soldiers were killed in this action.
Marines and their armor were deployed
in I Corps, the northernmost of four military districts in
Vietnam. An exception to this was Special Landing Force (SLF) of
the Navy’s Seventh Fleet, the strategic reserve for the Pacific
Far East. The SLF was available for amphibious landings in South
Vietnam. Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in
Vietnam, decided to use the SLF to clear Viet Cong forces from
the Rung Sat Special Zone south of Saigon. VC gunners were
firing on ships using the river channel that supplied the
Vietnamese capital. The result was
Operation Jackstay,
March 26-April 6, 1966. The operation had limited success but
not due to lack of ingenuity of the Marines, who experimented
with riverine warfare techniques including mounting an Ontos on
a LCM to provide fire support. Only 63 enemy troops were killed;
however, the shipping channel was at least temporarily clear.
The following incident illustrates the vulnerability of the M50
to enemy mines. It was spring, 1966. An armored column
supporting Company “K”, 3/9 was returning to base camp near Da
Nang. Three tanks and an Ontos went over a stream at a place
called Viem Dong Crossing without mishap. As the second M50
crossed, Platoon Commander Lt Allen Hoof heard a “pop”, turned
rearward, and saw the upper half of the vehicle blown off the
lower half, and lying upside down next to it. All three crewmen
were wounded. Acting Ontos Commander PFC Greg Weaver was quickly
removed from the vehicle but died almost immediately. The mine
explosion, perhaps either command detonated or activated by a
counter, caused the detonation of a 106mm round stored directly
under the commander. This secondary explosion blew the turret
off the vehicle and killed Weaver.
Since enemy tanks were not a problem for Marines in Vietnam,
Ontos use reverted to its secondary mission: providing direct
fire support for infantry. By late 1966 problems with Ontos
became evident. The supply of tracks was depleted, which caused
breakdowns on operations. This caused a reluctance to utilize
the M50. An even more important reason was several incidents of
accidental firings of recoilless rifles which cost some Marine
lives. This was an extremely serious problem for Ontos on convoy
duty. These accidents were caused by overly tight adjustment of
the firing cable allowing the firing pin to release prematurely.
This adjustment was a crew responsibility and required thorough
understanding of the firing cable, sear, and trigger. These
mishaps caused restrictions to be placed on Ontos’ use.
By 1967 the Marines were fighting two
wars in Vietnam. The 1st Marine Division engaged in counter
guerrilla operations in the southern part of I Corps while the
3rd Marine Division conducted mostly conventional war against
NVA along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the north. As the
Marines moved northward to counter the NVA threat, Ontos and
tanks provided important support. In May 1967, the 2nd
Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) and 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines
(2/26) began Operation Hickory
north of Con Thien. Fighting against enemy forces in well
prepared bunkers and trenches was heavy. M50s, using the proper
ammunition, proved to be devastating antipersonnel weapons.
After the conclusion of
Hickory, 2/9, accompanied by
tanks and Ontos, was sent on a spoiling attack into the DMZ. On
this operation the tracked vehicles proved more of a liability
than a tactical asset as the terrain restricted them to the
road. Instead of providing infantry support, the M50s and tanks
required infantry protection against NVA rocket propelled
grenade (RPG) attack. Using these vehicles as ambulances to
evacuate the wounded further reduced their offensive
capabilities.
1967 saw the introduction of CH-53 Sea
Stallion heavy-lift helicopters for the Marines in Vietnam. The
first models had a six-ton external lift capability. This meant
an Ontos could be transported by helicopter if it was broken
down into components with the hull transported externally. It
could then be reassembled and operated at destination, giving it
a transportability beyond its design considerations. M50s could
also go where tanks feared to tread (or should have): in a 1966
operation, tanks got stuck in flooded rice paddies. Ontos, with
less ground pressure, were able to drag timbers up to the tanks
without bogging down. In
Operation Jay, mentioned above,
the Ontos of B Company, 3rd Anti-Tanks were able to assist the
SVN Marines because they could cross a pontoon bridge - - the
only tracked vehicles light enough to drive to the operation.
Ontos could go more places than many people thought possible.
In December 1967, the 1st and 3rd Anti-Tank Battalions were
de-commissioned in Vietnam. One company from each battalion was
attached to the tank battalions. 1968 saw Ontos assume an
important role in some of the heaviest fighting of the entire
war, the Battle of Hue during the Tet Offensive. In February, 14
NVA battalions seized control of most of the city. The Americans
and South Vietnamese faced the formidable task of retaking this
important cultural center of the nation. The result was urban
fighting unlike anything seen in the war. The attacking Marines
had to take each building and each block one at a time. This
close-quarter combat and low flying clouds, coupled with the
desire to minimize damage to the city itself, meant there could
be little reliance on artillery and close air support.
Four tanks from the 3rd Tank Battalion along with a platoon of
Ontos from the Anti-Tank Company, 1st Tank Battalion, joined the
advance against strong enemy resistance. LtCol Ernest Cheatham,
commander of 2/5, had reservations about using tanks. One tank
sustained over 120 hits and another went through five or six
crews. Infantry commanders liked the Ontos better. Cheatham
described the M50 “as big a help as any item of gear we had that
was not organic” to the battalion. Regimental commander Col.
Stanley Hughes went even further when he claimed the Ontos was
the most effective of all the supporting arms the Marines had at
their disposal. Its mobility made up for its lack of armor
protection, noting that at ranges of 300 to 500 yards, its
recoilless rifles routinely opened “4 square meter holes or
completely knock[ed] out an exterior wall.” The armor plating of
the M50 was sufficient protection against enemy small arms fire
and grenades. However, B-40 ant-tank rockets were another story:
an Ontos with 1/1 was knocked out and the driver killed on
February 7 while supporting the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. The
essential role of tanks and M50s in the fighting illustrated by
the fact that Marines had to hold up their advance from time to
time for lack of 90mm tank and 106mm Ontos ammunition.
The Perfume River flows
through Hue. After clearing the south bank on February 11, the
1st Battalion, 5th Marines pushed north to clear NVA forces
firmly entrenched in the 4-square-mile Citadel, location of the
former Imperial Palace. USMC M-48 tanks and Ontos were placed
under the command of the attached tank platoon commander.
Tactically, the tank or Ontos commander, working with the
infantry commander, would reconnoiter a particular target area,
usually a masonry structure blocking the Marine advance.
Returning to their vehicle, the tank or Ontos commander would
move forward at full speed while the infantry laid down a heavy
volume of fire. Upon reaching a position where fire could be
directed on the target, the vehicle commander halted the
vehicle, fired two or three rounds into the structure, then
quickly reversed direction and returned to friendly front lines.
Casualties among armor crews were high.
On February 24, South Vietnamese troops finally dislodged
NVA forces from the Citadel. By the time the battle for Hue was
over, 50 percent of the city was destroyed.
Before, during, and
after the Battle of Hue, the 26th Marine Regiment was fighting
the North Vietnamese at Khe Sanh. Here the enemy tank threat was
real: 17 days into the battle at Khe Sanh, NVA tanks helped
overrun the nearby Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. Ten M50s
from B Co (-) 3rd Anti-Tank Battalion were
incorporated into Khe Sanh’s defenses. They were sometimes used
for reconnaissance but more often in static perimeter defense
roles. Author Robert Pisor notes the Ontos at Khe Sanh had
“enough flechette [anti-personnel] ammunition to pin the entire
North Vietnamese Army to the face of Co Roc Mountain.”
The Marine Corps began to deploy its forces out of Vietnam in
1969. Tank and amtrac units rotated early as fighting had ebbed
in the Corps’ area of responsibility. By this time the M50 parts
supply was depleted and the 106mm rifle was about to be replaced
by other weapons. M50 mechanics cannibalized disabled machines
to keep others running, but after Hue the Ontos were worn out.
Ironically, excess Ontos were given to Army forces (recall that
the Army initially rejected the Ontos as being unsuitable for
its requirements). These Army Ontos went to Company D, 16th
Armor, 173rd Airborne Brigade. The Army used its Ontos until
they ran out of spare parts, then employed them in fixed
bunkers. In the United States, the Marine 2nd Anti-Tank
Battalion was disbanded along with the 5th Marine Division. The
last Ontos garrison was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It
continued to operate until 1980 by which time it had one
operation vehicle. Two others were used for parts.
Upon return to the United States, the tops of the vehicles were
removed. Many of the chassis were sold for use as construction
equipment or give to local governments for rescue work. One
“platoon” of surplus M50s wound up in the service of the North
Carolina Forestry Service for use as fire fighting vehicles.
According to Vietnam veteran and former Marine Mike Scudder,
Ontos today are scarce. In fact, there are more surviving World
War I tanks than Ontos. Scudder should know: he bought the seven
from North Carolina and is restoring two of them. More than 60
Ontos are believed to be stored in the desert at the Marine
Corps facility, Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, CA.
Was the Ontos a successful addition to the Marine Corps arsenal?
The answer is quite simply, yes and no. The primary mission of
the M50 was a tank destroyer. In the actual tactical
environments in which it was deployed, there was little use for
this ability.
Its secondary mission was the
provision of direct fire support for the infantry. In this role
the Ontos was underutilized. The reason, according to Major D.C.
Satcher writing in the Marine
Corps Gazette, is because,
unlike artillery, air, and tanks, Ontos were little emphasized
in Marine officer training. Ontos were never used in any tactics
problems in The Basic School. Ontos crew did not have their own
MOS (instead, they were infantry MOS). An Ontos officer normally
served one tour with an M50 unit, then moved on. A weapons
system that is under-emphasized will be underutilized.
Although quick and agile (the M50
could go places no other Marine armored vehicle could go), it
had limitations. In addition to the problems previously noted
(premature firing and vulnerability to mining), the recoilless
rifles had to be loaded externally which meant the crew had to
leave the protection of an armored hull in order to reload. The
106mm recoilless rifle is no stealth weapon: when fired, the
tremendous back blast makes the Ontos’ location visible to the
enemy. Ontos crew had to ensure no friendly troops were in the
large back blast area when operating in confined areas.
There was no enemy armor for the Ontos
to destroy in Vietnam. Still, Marines are famous for their
ability to improvise, and the enemy infantry were plentiful. The
M50 was a formidable anti-personnel weapon. A couple of Ontos on
the perimeter could decimate Communist forces attack on Marine
fixed positions, a static role quite the opposite of its
designed high-mobility anti-armor role. My favorite example of
Marines ability to adapt to local tactical conditions is the
main streets of Hue City in February 1968. Not only good at
destroying structures, Ontos were able to provide a “smoke
screen” for infantry attacks: when Marine artillery was unable
to provide white phosphorus rounds, Ontos could fire “beehive”
rounds (explosive shells filled with thousands of small darts)
fired into masonry structures, thereby creating a dust cloud
that screened infantry movement. Marine infantry loved their
Ontos. In Phase Line Green:
The Battle for Hue, 1968,
author Nicholas Warr describes how the M50 platoon pounded the
enemy positions, accompanied to the choruses of “Get some!” sung
by infantry holed up in houses, waiting to move forward. Fact
is, even with its limitations, the Ontos was used and, to a
considerable degree, used up in Vietnam, providing invaluable
support for the Marines in I Corps.
Peter Brush
For
additional reading:
Kenneth W. Estes, Marines under
Armor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000)
William B
Allmon, “The Ontos,” Vietnam, August 1994
Note:
This article is the revision of an earlier article published in
Vietnam magazine, October, 2002. It includes corrections
to the original article and additional information.
About
the Author:
Here's how he first learned of Ontos. When he was a tadpole, his
father was stationed at the Marine Corps Supply Depot at
Barstow, California. This was in the 1950s. He saw plenty of
tanks and amtracs in their huge storage areas but the Ontos was
especially interesting looking; so different and formidable,
compared to anything else, even though much smaller.
He saw them again next
time at Khe Sanh during the siege. Often they were deployed at
night facing down the long axis of the airstrip, in case the NVA
decided to attack the base from that direction -- as he recalls,
the airstrip extended right to the perimeter, even a bit beyond.
After a few weeks of fighting, his thinking was, "come on in,
NVA, and see what Ontos with beehive rounds can do!"
Ah,
and the rest is history
And more:
Peter served in the Marine artillery units in Quang Tri province
from August 1967 to July 1968 with 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
and 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. With 1/13 he was admin chief of
Mortar Battery at Khe Sanh during the 1968 siege. He has a BA
and MA in history and a MLIS degree in library science. He
retired from Vanderbilt University in 2013, where he was the
history librarian. He has published over 100 articles, mostly
about the Marines in Vietnam.
(Many of which are found on the Foundation’s web site)
|
Ugly ONTOS
is Underrated
Maj. D.C. Satcher
Marine Corps Gazette
(pre-1994); Nov 1969; 53, 11; ProQuest Direct Complete Pg 88
Without doubt the strangest
looking combat vehicle in the Marine Corps in the ONTOS. It has
been scoffed at, ignored and underrated for many years. But this
strange looking weapon has potentials that many of us have
overlooked. Its primary mission is, of course, to defeat enemy
armor. The secondary mission, to provide direct fire support for
the infantry, is the subject of this article. This can be
accomplished by answering the following questions with a view
towards its past use in Vietnam. Why isn’t it used? What are its
positive and negative features? How can it be used in its
secondary mission?
Why isn’t it used? The foremost
reason is that it is not thought of. Artillery, air, and to a
lesser extent tanks immediately come to mind anytime something
larger than a rifle is needed. It is second nature to call on
them. They have all been in our arsenal for many years and are
stressed in our teachings. The ONTOS, though, has not been
around very long and is not stressed in our teachings.
The ideas and principles we learn
at The Basic School stay with us for many years and guide our
later actions. At The Basic School, artillery, air and tanks are
the supporting arms which receive the most emphasis. The ONTOS
makes only two appearances during a Lieutenant’s 21-week course.
The first is at a field firing of the 106mm recoilless rifle.
The ONTOS does fire, but the emphasis is not placed on a vehicle
which can traverse rough terrain and deliver accurate fire on a
target within seconds after the need arises; rather the emphasis
is placed on another means of transporting the 106. The next
appearance occurs at a static display of Marine Corps tracked
vehicles. It is never used in any tactics problem, thereby
taking an inferior position to the other supporting arms.
Every major supporting arm in the
Marine Corps is represented by a particular MOS. Officers stay
in the MOS for years and constantly “sell” their weapon. The
ONTOS cannot boast of its own officer MOS. The primary MOSs in
an Antitank Battalion are 0302 and 1802, infantry and tanks.
When an officer is assigned to an Antitank Battalion, it is
usually for only one tour and then he moves on. He is not there
long enough to develop the complete understanding that is
necessary. Thus the knowledge, enthusiasm and attachment are
usually missing to aggressively “sell” the ONTOS, particularly
in RVN.
The ONTOS started its decline in
RVN in late 1966. Two factors were involved. They supply of
track was depleted, causing breakdowns on operations and a
reluctance to employ it. The primary reason, though, was that
several accidental occurred which cost some Marine lives. This
caused the doubt that was cast on the ONTOS. These accidents
were caused by the firing cable, sear and trigger working
improperly either separately or together. If the firing cable
were adjusted too tightly, the firing pin could release. This
adjustment was a crew responsibility and required thorough
understanding. Such a design, peculiar to the ONTOS, was not
good. How many weapons do we have that require such an
adjustment by the crewmen or individual? These accidental
firings caused restrictions to be placed on the vehicle and a
further decline in its use. The longer the vehicle stayed in
RVN, the less it was used, up to the day the last one was
removed in Okinawa.
What are its positive and negative
features? It can save Marine lives. How many times have infantry
elements encountered automatic weapons, bunkers or some obstacle
where a well placed 106mm round could do the job? The ONTOS’s
fire is accurate to 1200 meters and it cannot miss at 100 or 200
meters. Each vehicle carries eighteen 106mm rounds, or ninety
per platoon, and a machine gun. The infantry does not have to
worry about communicating with the ONTOS, for each vehicle has
the radios necessary to monitor the infantry net as well as its
own. The distance it can drive on a tank of gas is farther than
the infantry can walk in days, making the resupply problem less
burdensome than expected.
Trafficability is usually looked
at as the major limitation of any tracked vehicle. First, let us
see where it can go. It can drive from Da Nang to Dong Ha and
down Route #9, negotiating any bridge on the way. Any bridge
that can hold ten tons can support the ONTOS. It has gone
through many flooded rice paddies, for the ground pressure is
not that great. During one operation in the Khobi Tahn Tahn area
in 1966, tanks got stuck due to heavy rains. ONTOS were used to
drag timbers up to the tanks and did not get stuck in the
process. ONTOS have even been lifted by helicopters on several
occasions. One load consisted of the six recoilless rifles,
ammunition and associated equipment. The hull was then lifted
externally by a CH-53 helicopter. This has been done on several
occasions in the Da Nang area. The ONTOS were lifted to an area,
assembled and operated. Granted, trafficability is the big
limitation, but the ONTOS can go more placed than most people
believe possible. Breakdowns are another limitation, but like
anything mechanical, an adequate supply of repair parts will
keep this to a minimum.
How can the ONTOS be used in its
secondary mission? The ONTOS is not a tank and should not be
used as one. It should be used to follow the lead infantry
elements on sweeps where terrain is negotiable. When an obstacle
is encountered, such as an automatic weapon, it can be brought
forward and take the target under fire. The vehicle has light
armor protection, thus it takes a .50 caliber or larger weapon
to knock it out. Definitely, the ONTOS cannot go on every
operation, but there are innumerable places that the vehicle can
negotiate, and be an asset to the fire power of the infantry.
An excellent example of its
usefulness was on June 29, 1966. “B” Company, 3rd Antitank
Battalion was on Operation JAY north of Hue with the 4th
Marines. Approximately 1,400 meters away on Route #1, a
Vietnamese Marine Corps convoy was ambushed. The ONTOS Company
and “I” Company 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines went to their aid.
The ONTOS crossed a pontoon bridge across the Song O Lau, which
“I” Company stayed to protect, and went to the ambush. As soon
as the ONTOS appeared at the ambush site all NVA firing stopped.
The vehicles swept through the short brush west of Route #1
engaging many NVA. Several of the enemy were killed and one
captured by an ONTOS platoon commander. ONTOS were used because
there was a need for a tracked vehicle with heavy fire power and
they were the only ones available. Why? Because they were the
only tracked vehicles light enough to drive to the operation.
The ONTOS can be very useful if we
can be motivated to think about its capabilities and utilize its
potential. Many people have a residual attitude that the vehicle
is no good. True, the rifles need a modification and repair
parts are needed; but other than that, the ONTOS is a good
weapon as it is. It is an important part of our combat power
that is being overlooked. Therefore, once the needed
improvements have been made, we should put it to good,
aggressive use in RVN and elsewhere, even if it is strange
looking.
|
“Improving” the Ontos
A
number of ideas to “improve” the Ontos to better its capability
to support the infantry units in both their defensive and
offensive missions were experimented with. Here is evidence from
the March 1966 1st Anti-tank Battalion’s Command Chronology that
merited consideration. The testing of the idea took place on
Okinawa by 1st AT’s, based on feedback from in-country AT and
Infantry units. It appears (i.e., reference to ordering 60 M85
.50 caliber machine guns) that this was a done deal. (?)
The above picture is a cut/paste
from the referenced Command Chronology
Below
is a snap shot of the “finished product”.
|
Let’s
Transfer Ontos to Barstow
Bernard E
Trainor
Copy of “Let’s Transfer Ontos
to Barstow”
Marine Corps Gazette
May 1961
Ontology may be described as the science of reality, the
investigation of the essential properties of a thing. What, pray
tell, does this philosophical noun have to do with the
profession of arms? With apologies to Plato and the gang, we
will take the disciplines of ontology and apply them to the
existing "thing" which has bastardized its name - Ontos. If
consigned to the limbo of Barstow tomorrow, Ontos will have
shared the distinction (with cotton khaki battle jacket) of
being one of our Corp's more short-lived expressions of
individuality. It is doubtful that the plaintive wails which
attended the honorable retirement of the "60 mortar" would ever
echo around the driver's hatch of the tracked "Dempster
Dumpster." Rightly so, for weighing about the same as a healthy
pachyderm, Ontos is a white elephant in our family of versatile
weapons. This air-transportable orphan was adopted with
sincerity by the Corps, during a period of helicopter
intoxication, to replace the AT function of the tank within the
division. It was adopted to provide the division with a
realistic anti-tank weapon. This it fails to do. A weapon, to be
worthwhile, should give us the maximum return in terms of its
effectiveness for a minimum investment. I maintain that in this
regard, Ontos is hardly blue chip stock. Six shares of BAT*
stock give us a greater return on our money than one share of
Ontos common. Even then, however, we have a weak investment
portfolio.
Let's look at the primary mission of Ontos, its
anti-tank task. We must concede that Ontos can knock out tanks.
Anybody's. If you have ever watched a trained crew operate you
know what I mean. However, go beyond the guns and look at the
weapon as a whole. Armor protection is insignificant; therefore,
it cannot stand a slugging match. You may say, "Weaponry is
ascendant over armor and not even the heaviest tank can
withstand a direct hit from a modern AT gun." I maintain that
Ontos can't even slug it out with a grease gun. One blast of
automatic fire at the unprotected banks of guns will sever the
exposed fire control system; leave the hull intact and us with
$70,000 liability. At least with BAT*s it would take six bursts
in six different directions to accomplish the same end. Shall we
move on?
Back-blast not only
gives the nearby infantry a cracking good fright but tends to
incinerate the unschooled to its rear. Admittedly, this is
hardly a consideration in battle, but, more importantly, that
impressive blast also tips your location to the enemy's base of
fire (tank & SP). Needless to say, Ontos as a source of
annoyance will be honored by immediate and unfriendly attention.
Of course, here is where Ontos maneuverability comes into play
and hasty withdrawal to defilade saves the day. But does it?
Hardly. We have to delay and raise the travel locks to support
the guns before we can move, else we will snap our multiple
muskets into an attitude of decided embarrassment-pointing at
mother earth. However, to raise these travel locks, the gunner
must center the guns in azimuth and elevation while the driver
must crank an archaic hydraulic system for an eternity until the
locks marry with the tubes and allow safe movement. Reflect if
you will, the action of that enemy base of fire during all this.
Assuming that we are successful in eventually getting into
defilade, where do we go from here? An alternate position would
be logical, but remember that T-54 in the distance is wise to us
now and his 100mm is looking in our direction. If we reappear
nearby - whacko! Okay, insure that the alternate position is not
in the immediate vicinity of the primary position. Full credit
for your logic! It might work but in the meantime hasn't the
enemy really beaten us at our own game? While we move the
distance to an alternate site compatible with safety and
surprise, we are out of action and the enemy's maneuver element
has moved frighteningly close. Besides, the enemy is probably
tracking our tell-tale dust anyway and our alternate position
will prove as uncomfortable as the one in the first instance.
Why not forget about the alternate position and break
contact to a pre-selected position to the rear to contain any
break-through? This is reasonable if we are willing to accept
the fact that our major anti-tank weapon has been good for only
one shot during a critical point in the battle. Of course, the
psychological impact on the front line "snuffy" when he sees his
major AT unit heading for the rear in the face of an armored
attack might be a matter of concern. Also, in open country, our
M-50 might be degraded with an enemy shot in the back during
this rearward movement. And what about this open terrain, this
rolling countryside so favored by a fire and-maneuver tank
attack? Here we have our greatest Ontos liability. Our primary
AT weapon sits basking in all the glory of its 1800 yard
effective range while the opposition tanks crack away at us at
ranges considerably in excess of ours. They are damaging us with
their tanks long before we can employ our anti-tanks against
them. Better lay the artillery for direct fire, Marines!
Perhaps I'm unfair. I set the scene for the illustration
and naturally it tends to support my views. How about a
situation favoring Ontos employment? Consider close country
where range counts for naught? How about the ambush capabilities
of Ontos. Unsurpassed, are they not? The answer is quite so. It
is a close country anti-tank weapon; it is an ambush weapon and
little else, and this is the point. The Ontos violates the
principle of economy of force. It is an expensive weapon
restricted only to situations which favor its limited
capabilities-defensive capabilities of ambush and short range.
Does this return warrant the expense in terms of dollars,
personnel, support and maintenance effort necessary to sustain
an Ontos-equipped battalion? I say no. Leave the short ranges to
the BAT*s and provide the AT battalion with a weapon which has
the range and ruggedness to do battle with tanks before the
infantry has to cope with them.
Bernard E Trainor**
218 Cordoba San Clemente, Calif. –
See more at:
https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/1961/05/lets-transfer-ontos-barstow#sthash.beosjQjp.dpuf
*BAT =
Battalion AntiTank [system] = 106mm RR in that time frame. It
was a trilateral program [US, UK, CA]. Thank you for this
definition Dr. Ken Estes, USMC(Ret.) who is a Foundation Board
Member, oft-published author, and has contributed significantly
to the discussion of the Ontos.
** Retired
Marine Corps Lieutenant General
|
Little
Orphan ONTOS
by1stLt. William J Lannes III
Marine Corps Gazette
(pre-1994); Aug 1963; 47, 8; ProQuest Direct Complete Pg. 41
It may
surprise you to learn that many Marines don’t understand Marine
Corps weapons. This is particularly true of our supporting arms
and especially true of ONTOS. Most Marines know about the great
armor-defeating qualities of the 106mm recoilless rifle and its
accompanying (and undesirable) back blast. They also know that
the ONTOS has good cross country ability and offers some
protection against small arms. Few Marines, however, know how to
use the weapon properly and even fewer have confidence in what
it can do. This is appalling because ONTOS is the Marine
division’s primary close-in antitank weapon.
In my view,
ONTOS is a good weapon. This opinion is based on my experience
with the weapon while serving with the 3d Antitank Battalion on
Okinawa. When first assigned, I was apprehensive. I didn’t hold
the weapon in high esteem. Fortunately, I joined a group of
Marines who were dedicated to proving the worth of the ONTOS. To
our surprise and relief we found that, for its intended job, the
United States has no finer weapon. Neither I nor my colleagues,
however, ever felt that ONTOS was the ultimate-there is much
room for improvement.
ONTOS was
adopted to replace the antitank function formerly carried out by
tanks organic to the division. However, the very first thing to
understand about ONTOS is that it is in no way, shape or form a
tank. That statement may sound silly to some, but it is amazing
how many Marines think of ONTOS as a tank. They say it can’t
stand up in slugging match with a tank because its armor
protection is insignificant. ONTOS was never intended to outslug
anybody-it is not an armored vehicle. ONTOS is in the same class
as the Army “Scorpion” (90mm gun on tracks) which has no armor
at all. ONTOS crews realize that the vehicle’s thin steel
plating will only stop shrapnel and small arms. They also know
small arms can affect the weapon’s efficiency because of its
vulnerable hydraulic system.
Because of the
characteristics of the 106mm recoilless rifle, too many Marines
feel that ONTOS is good for only one shot before the show is
over. It is surprising how few people apply fire discipline,
which they have taught or been taught throughout their careers,
to larger caliber weapons. Fire discipline plays a major role in
antitank outfits of any kind. In tank defense, ONTOS never fire
all at one time. Generally, the light section (two vehicles)
opens fire when the tanks are in range. Each vehicle can fire
aimed shots on different targets in a matter of seconds. As the
light section moves back to reload and into its alternate
position, the heavy section (three vehicles) picks up the fire
on the remaining tanks. When the tank crews have adjusted to
this new enemy fire, they find only fleeting targets and are met
by fire from the new position of the light section. Depending on
the type of action being fought and the situation, variations of
this tactic can be used. Good crews and close teamwork are
required. However, after practice and training, the 3d Antitank
Battalion proved ONTOS to be effective against tanks. How? By
putting the tankers’ reaction time and maneuverability against
those of the ONTOS crews.
Proper
training enables ONTOS crews to adapt to various combat
situations. Because of the vulnerability of the ONTOS, antitank
units should work at night whenever possible. Just before dark,
the vehicles should be parked in an assembly area, taking normal
precautions as to distance, camouflage, and defilade. The
dismounted crews then go forward on foot to examine the terrain
they are to defend. Each position should be determined (both
primary and alternate) and routes to and from them should be
mapped out. When the positions are selected, the crews must
insure that they can find their positions in the dark. During
the night the vehicles are brought forward and the crews then
prepare their positions (in many cases this requires extensive
digging). All work must be completed by dawn so that movement
will not give away the positions to enemy ground or air
observers.
Principles
of Camouflage
In night
operations, coordination must be effected with the infantry unit
responsible for the area. The infantry must supply security for
anti-tank units. Variations of this procedure depend on the
situation. Whether the unit is in a position or on mobile
defense also affects the selection of positions. In all cases,
however, camouflage must be completed by morning. It is
essential that the enemy does not locate the ONTOS defensive
positions because of the greater range of tank and artillery
guns. Surprise is one of the primary considerations in antitank
operations.
Understanding
the principles of camouflage and terrain analysis is important
because the ONTOS has to operate in all types of terrain. Many
Marines have expressed concern about the terrain in which the
ONTOS will be forced to operate. They are particularly dubious
about open terrain, which is considered the best tank country.
This rolling tank terrain offers enough protection for the
highly maneuverable ONTOS. In the Mt. Fuji training area, where
our overseas tank units do a great deal of their training, tanks
and ONTOS were pitted against each other. At the start of the
exercise, the tank battalion was spread out at one end of the
problem area. The terrain was such that with the aid of field
glasses the tanks could be seen for many miles. The night before
the problem began, the ONTOS units had moved in to occupy the
forward defensive area. Thus, on the morning the problem began,
the ONTOS units were in position waiting for the tanks. When the
tanks came within range the ONTOS fired (blanks from the 30 cal.
machine guns) and began leap-frogging to various positions, both
lateral and in depth. Using knolls and cuts, the antitank units
were able to keep generally out of the line of sight of the
advancing tank.
The biggest
problem the ONTOS had was with the aircraft employed against
them. The planes would occasionally catch an ONTOS moving on the
road and would make runs on it. The antitank units had no air
support during the problem; therefore, the tanks were not
harassed by air attacks.
An important aspect of the
antitank operation was mutual support and depth. All of the
ONTOS moves were covered by positioned vehicles. In short, the
men understood the weapon, used the terrain to their advantage,
and came out ahead as a result.
The results of
this and similar field problems certainly indicate the worth of
ONTOS. However, there are still Marines who refuse to accept any
weapon that hasn’t been combat tested. Some Marines concede that
ONTOS may be useful for close-in work but they shudder to think
of operating against large scale tank attacks launched at great
distances. Let’s not get our thinking out of focus. Certainly
ONTOS is our primary antitank weapon but it’s not the only one.
Anti-mechanized plans include all supporting arms with tasks
assigned according to the capabilities and range of each. If the
Marine Corps should find itself in a big land campaign in wide
open territory against large tank attacks, then the ONTOS will
play an important, but not exclusive anti-mechanized role. Those
enemy vehicles that do get as close in as the ONTOS sector will
find it tough going.
The ONTOS also
has limited offensive capabilities. However, in considering its
offensive role, the weapon’s limitations must be emphasized.
ONTOS’ primary mission is to provide direct-fire support for
infantry units.
The most
important thing to remember about ONTOS in support of infantry
is the weapon’s vulnerability. No squad leader would use a
flamethrower without giving the man carrying it the fire support
needed to enable him to maneuver to a relatively safe firing
position. This same thinking must be applied to the ONTOS. The
unit that calls the ONTOS up to knock out a pill box must give
it fire support. Then the weapon can maneuver to the least
vulnerable firing position to deliver its devastating payload.
ONTOS can be
used in various fire support roles if not subjected to heavy
concentrations of large caliber or small arms fire. Of course,
everyone is expected to take risks- and ONTOS crews are no
exception-but let’s not sacrifice our antitank capabilities
unnecessarily.
The ONTOS is
certainly a controversial weapon. That it is expensive and has
faults is undeniable; but for the purpose designed it is the
best we have in the field. ONTOS was never intended to be a long
range, armored vehicle. Its function is the same as the vehicle
mounted 106mm recoilless rifle except that it can do the job
much better. It is much more maneuverable in all types of
terrain. In fact, there were many times when our ONTOS retrieved
106s bogged down in mud.
Superior
to Tanks
The ONTOS also
is superior to tanks in snow and mud. It has tremendous initial
firepower and an excellent firing and sighting system. It is not
so dependent on its 50 cal. spotting rifle and can use burst on
target with deadly effect. ONTOS’ parallel communications system
offers a means of flexible control. Such factors combine to give
it much more staying power than our other antitank weapons. This
staying power is not to be confused with “slugging it out”.
ONTOS can stop tanks by tactics and firepower, giving up only
minimum ground or none at all.
It is
important to remember that the ONTOS is not a tank. It is a
tank-killer. Most of us are not anxious to climb into the ring
with a professional boxer. If we met one man on the street,
however, and stabbed him in the back, he would be just as dead
as if we had met him on his own terms. That’s the way it is with
ONTOS.
It is
important that our supporting arms be used correctly and their
efforts coordinated. The more our leaders understand and use
their supporting arms the better the Marine Corps will be. Those
who have a chance to work with ONTOS should use it to full
advantage. It is the least understood and most abused weapon in
our arsenal.
|
M50 Ontos:
The Forgotten Tank-killer
By
Brendan McNally - February 12, 2013
Frontal view
of the M50 Ontos and its Marine crew during Operation Franklin
in the Quang Ngai province of Vietnam, June of 1966. (U.S.
Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections photo)
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It is the
tradition in the U.S. Army to
name its tanks after great generals. Over the years there has
been
the Stuart, the Grant and Lee, the Sherman,
the Patton,
the Pershing,
the Abrams, the
Sheridan, the Chaffee, and
the Bradley. But there was one armored vehicle that was so
singularly odd and strange looking; it didn’t get named after
anyone, lest perhaps, some insult might be taken. Instead, the
name it got handed was Ontos, the Greek word for “the thing.” It
was an apt name. With its tiny chassis, tinier turret and six,
massive, externally mounted recoilless rifles; the M50 Ontos had
to have been the strangest armored vehicle ever to make it into
the American military inventory.
Except for some
Marine
Vietnam veterans, the Ontos is, today, almost wholly
unremembered.
A M50 Ontos
during a training exercise at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va.,
Dec. 19, 1955. U.S. Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections
photo.
The reason
has less to do with the Ontos’ battlefield performance, which at
times was stellar, than it did with the fact that only about 300
were ever built, a little more than half of which survived up to
the time of the Vietnam War. It meant there weren’t enough Ontos
to engage the tactician’s imagination and so it never featured
in tactics problems in the basic schools. There was never a
military occupational specialty for Ontos crews. Officers might
serve in an Ontos unit for a tour, but then they’d move on to
something else and whatever they’d learned from it never really
entered into the institutional memory. Another reason was that
Ontos was designed as a tank killer, but since the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) only rarely used tanks, Ontos was used
mainly as an ad hoc weapon.
But fight it
did, distinguishing itself at Hue, Khe Sanh, and countless other
battles. For all its out-and-out eccentricity, Marines found it
handy to have around because it was nimble and fast. Thanks to
its relatively light weight, Ontos fairly glided through swamps
and rice paddies, where heavier vehicles wisely feared to tread.
And Ontos packed a punch that was way beyond its weight class.
For this reason, the NVA feared it and avoided the Ontos
wherever possible.
If there was
a general after whom the Ontos should have been named, it
probably would have been Lt. Gen. James Gavin, wartime commander
of the 82nd Airborne Division. After the war he wrote a book
called Airborne
Warfare, outlining his vision for using airborne forces
in future wars. Part of it involved using air-transportable
mechanized forces as a kind of light cavalry, capable of doing
reconnaissance, and when necessary, laying extremely deadly
ambushes against enemy armor. In the spirit of cavalry, such
vehicles would have to sacrifice protection in favor of speed,
agility, and ability to deliver serious firepower.
The Ontos
program began in November 1950 as a joint Army-Marine Corps
program. The development contract went to Allis Chalmers’ Farm
Machinery Division, with the work being carried out at the
company’s Agricultural Assembly Plant in LaPort, IN. According
to legend, the spec sheet they developed it from was only
one-page long. Among the few things that it specified was that
its running gear would be based on the M56 Light Anti-Tank
Vehicle and that it would utilize the same six-cylinder, inline
gas engine common to all the military’s 2½-ton
GMC trucks.
In 1953, the
prototype was presented to the U.S. Army, and they immediately
hated what they saw. They hated that it was so small and too
tall and that there was not enough room inside it, either for
the three-man crew or for ammunition for the recoilless rifles,
of which only 18 rounds could be carried. They didn’t like that
the turret was so shallow, really little more than a cast steel
turntable and hatch in the middle. They hated that the six
recoilless rifles that made up its armament were externally
mounted and had to be reloaded from the outside. They didn’t
like that the half-inch armor plating on the sides wouldn’t
protect the crew members from anything larger than
.50 caliber machine gun rounds, and that the underside’s
armor plate was not even half that thick, making it totally
vulnerable to mines or anything that might explode underneath
it. The Army backed out of the project, canceling their share of
the 1,000 vehicle order.
Two M50 Ontos
from the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion move up to support a 2nd
Battalion, 4th Marines patrol in the Quang Tin Province of
Vietnam during Operation Iowa. U.S. Marine Corps Archives &
Special Collections photo.
The Marines,
on the other hand, were not nearly so fussy. They liked that
Ontos was so fast and agile and seemed capable of going anywhere
they went, which was more than could be said about most tanks.
They accepted that instead of being able to fight it out with
enemy tanks, the Ontos would have to “shoot-and-scoot” to a
place where it could safely reload. As for its pronounced lack
of protection, they shrugged. For Marines, being shot at was
nothing new. They placed an order for 297 Ontos. The production
contract went to Allis Chalmers, which started building them in
1955 and finished in 1957, with the first vehicle accepted by
the Marine Corps on Oct. 31, 1956.
The Ontos’
official name was: “Rifle, Multiple 106mm self-propelled M50.”
At its heart was the M40 106 mm recoilless rifle, a weapon which
had been developed after World War II as a tank killer, based on
the earlier M27, 105mm recoilless rifle, which turned out to
have a number of key deficiencies. The rounds the M40 fired were
not, in fact, 106mm, but 105mm, but were designated as 106mm to
keep from being confused with the M27’s round, which was not
compatible with the M40. The M40 had the accuracy, the range, a
serious punch forward and a serious kick aft. During the Ontos’
testing at the Army’s
Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, all six guns were fired
at once and the backblast was so great that it knocked bricks
out of nearby buildings and shattered numerous car windows.
The powerful
recoilless rifles’ accuracy was greatly aided by attaching .50
caliber spotting rifles to four of the Ontos’ six M40s. The
rifle fired a tracer round whose trajectory, at least for the
first 1,100 yards, was nearly identical to the M40s, and it
marked the spot it hit with a visible puff of smoke. The
spotting rifle’s own range was only 1,500 yards, and hitting
targets beyond that required burst-on target and bracketing
techniques of fire adjustment.
A M50 Ontos
fires at snipers along the urban streets of Hue during the
Battle of Hue City, 1968. The Ontos proved its value during the
Tet Offensive. U.S. Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections
photo.
The first
time Ontos was deployed was during the Lebanon Crisis of 1958.
Since it was a peaceful intervention, it saw no action. Six
years later it did go into combat during the American
intervention in the Dominican Republic of 1964. There it
encountered and promptly destroyed several enemy tanks,
including a French-built AMX-13 and an old Swedish L-60. It was
the only time the Ontos ever performed the mission it was built
for.
Then came
Vietnam. In 1965, during the initial American buildup, the
Marines sent over two anti-tank battalions equipped with Ontos.
With no enemy tanks to fight, the Ontos companies were quickly
spread out and attached to other units. The problem was, with no
doctrine in place for them other than for fighting tanks, the
Ontos were used or not used largely according to the whim of the
commander of whatever units they were attached to.
Though they
quickly proved themselves as highly capable infantry support
weapons, providing excellent frontal fire and flank protection,
the Ontos had some serious shortcomings. After one or two would
get destroyed by mines or rocket-propelled grenades, their unit
commander often found his enthusiasm for them considerably
dampened and relegated them to static defense duties. Another
problem that plagued the Ontos was repeated accidental firings
of its recoilless rifles because of too-tightly adjusted firing
cables.
Even so, the
Ontos continued to be deployed supporting infantry. Using HEAT
rounds, the Ontos was an excellent bunker-buster. But where it
truly excelled was as an anti-personnel weapon. A “beehive”
round was developed for the M40 that, upon exploding, unleashed
a massive whirlwind cloud of nearly 10,000 steel flechettes. As
a result, the VC and NVA were terrified of the Ontos and avoided
it wherever possible.
A M50 Ontos
leads commandeered vehicles during the Battle for Hue City,
1968. The Ontos was spearheading the effort to MedEvac and
resupply Marines in Hue during the Tet Offensive. U.S. Marine
Corps Archives & Special Collections photo.
In December
1967, the Marines reorganized their anti-tank battalions and as
a result, the Ontos units were all attached to tank battalions.
By this point, the Ontos was becoming worn out. Treads and other
replacement parts were becoming difficult to obtain.
Increasingly, Ontos were being cannibalized to keep others
operating. It was already obvious its days were numbered. Then,
on Jan. 30, 1968, the NVA launched the Tet Offensive. It was one
of the longest and bloodiest battles of the entire Vietnam War,
nowhere as hard fought as in Hue City.
For the
Ontos, the battle was its shining moment of glory. After the
American (2/5) and South Vietnamese forces cleared the south
bank of the Perfume River, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marine
Regiment (1/5) reached the Citadel. A number of Ontos were
brought up and one by one, began taking out the buildings where
the enemy were holed up. One of the Marine officers leading the
siege of the Citadel later identified the Ontos as “the most
effective of all Marine supporting arms,” in the Battle of Hue.
At the same time, the NVA siege of Khe Sanh was also under way.
With the threat of NVA armor anticipated, 10 Ontos were
airlifted into Khe Sanh by MH-53 helicopter, and incorporated
into its defense. There, the Ontos also performed with
distinction.
A year later,
the Marines deactivated their Ontos units and the vehicles were
handed over to the Army’s light infantry brigade. The Army used
them until their parts ran out and then employed them as
bunkers. What happened to them after that is largely unknown.
After
Vietnam, some were handed over to civilian agencies and used as
forestry vehicles. A tiny number made it into collectors’ hands.
Some are in museums. According to Mike Scudder, a former Marine
who owns several, there are more World War I tanks in
circulation than there are Ontos. This may not actually be true,
since there are believed to be more than 60 Ontos sitting
discarded in the desert on a Marine Corps reservation near China
Lake, Calif. If they are still there, no one is saying.
|
“Oral
History Interview of 1st Lt. Robert G. L’Heureux, USMC, Which
Describes ONTOS Operations South of Marble Mountain, Republic of
Vietnam During September, 1965”
While in Vietnam I was assigned to 3rd
Tank Battalion Platoon Commander from June –Oct 1965, which I
was evacuated in Oct and when I returned I was assigned to
headquarters Battalion 3rd Marine Division for duties as
Security Platoon Commander. While with the Tank Battalion I was
located principally about 15 miles south of DaNang across the
Tourane River. While Headquarters Battalion Commander, I was
located approximately 10 miles NW of the airstrip itself in
DaNang and the area of CP. The only major combat action the
Battalion, largest size that I can remember or participated in
was as said earlier was with the 1st Battalion 9th Marines in
Operation GOLDEN FLEECE in the fall 1965. It took place in the
Marble Mountain area. Purpose of the operation was to deny tank
gathering operation of the Viet Cong during the rice harvesting
season, this extended operation took place over a 2 week period
in which a great deal of patrolling activity and almost daily
sweeps were conducted throughout the same areas to remove any
infiltration by the VC in the rice harvesters. Generally what
would occur in operation commenced at dawn or earlier and the
area would be swept of all indigenous personnel would be taken
to collection points usually by AmTrak or if it was close
enough, they were marched there. They were treated according to
the way, generally, acted when they were picked up. They were
then interviewed by the District Chief and his team of
policemen, I suppose they were. The VC suspects were separated
from the rest of the populace. The people who were declared
innocent of any connection with the VC were generally treated to
a series of lectures and films on rice harvesting. General
propaganda, lectures given, a number of pamphlets and perhaps
small amounts of rice and things like this to compensate for
their loss of time since they were secured from their rice
harvesting by this operation. It was generally considered to be
successful. There was a minimal patrol type of contact and one
larger contact that took place with Alpha Company one night. The
operation, in general, occurred in the villages we were in Sept
1965. A villager ran into to see the District Chief, who was
living at that time adjacent to the 1st Battalion 9th Marine
Battalion are, right underneath Marble Mountain, and informed
the District Chief that a VC Battalion had moved into his
village and had declared that they were there to fight the
Marines. Their actual purpose was, I supposed to collect rice as
taken their duty from the populace. This word came in about 0800
and at about 1230, the operation had kicked off. Under the
command of the Alpha Company Commander with 2 attached platoons
from Charlie Company 1st Battalion 9th Marines, ONTOS platoon
and a tank platoon Bravo Company 3rd Tanks. The operation was a
sweep Marble Mountain south until contact was made. Contact was
made approximately 1 1/2 hours later with the 2 platoon from
Charlie Company were on the right of the sweeping front. Alpha
Company extended the rest of the way toward the left flank,
ONTOS screen by themselves from the beach and connected with the
last infantry platoon in the left flank. The tanks were spread
out to support through the three. Alpha Company platoon were
generally in the middle of the sector. Originally I divided the
line perpendicularly which caused later when one of the platoon
from Charlie, lead by Lt. Gerald Robbins came under fire in a
rice paddy and the other for some reason, there was no radio
contact was made and Company Commander was unable to determine
just exactly what was going on or if anything was going on. The
ONTOS platoon that I had, for some reason had contact all the
way on the other side of the company front. We moved in support
them we had to cross the ridge line and go down into the rice
paddy. When arrived in the rice paddy, nothing was going on at
all, the tank that was originally with us but couldn’t stay
because he could not navigate the rice paddy. He left, I don’t
know where he went. About 4 or 5 minutes later, some HE’s were
going off in the area. At first it was thought to be 80 mm
mortar fire but since the rounds were landing in almost the same
place, it was determined that it must have been 3.5 or 57 mm
recoilless rifle.
Question: Is this a friendly one?
L’Heureux: This was not friendly at all.
This was also coordinated with a great deal of machine gun fire
spreading out in the area.
Question: This is Viet Cong fire, right?
L’Heureux: Yes sir, up to this time we
still had not made any contact with the infantry platoon that
was there. Radio contact was sporadically…
Question: Were you out there by yourself
at this time? You were not being supported by the infantry, is
that right?
L’Heureux: No sir, that’s not correct. We
were screening left flank of the whole company front along the
beach and we swung…..
Question: You were accompanied by
infantry…
L’Heureux: We were trying to hook
up with them since we knew difficulty knowing no one else could
make contact with them. I had no contact with the Company
Commander of Alpha Company myself. There was big radio foul up.
Generally it was about 15 minutes before we contacted the
infantry, who turned out to be laying in the rice, apparently
waiting for the rest of the company to come to their support.
Question: There were two platoon
of Charlie Company? One platoon of Charlie Company and your
ONTOS.
L’Heureux: One platoon of Charlie
Company. Yes, Sir.
Question: Did you attempt to
establish communications through your channels with the Company,
infantry or Platoon leaders?
L’Heureux: Yes sir, there was no
communication to be had. Whatsoever.
Question: You said earlier that
you had contact with the entire operations, is that right?
L’Heureux: Originally
Question: I see, but then it
failed after you were separated from the rest of the operation
by the ridgeline.
L’Heureux: Yes sir.
Question: Couldn’t raise the
tanks? Couldn’t raise …
L’Heureux: We could raise the
tanks until we moved down into this valley..
Question: No communication other
than the platoon you were with and ONTOS?
L’Heureux: We had inter-vehicle
communications and I had contact with the Platoon Commander from
Charlie Company that had originally gotten into trouble.
Question: What kind of radio did
the platoon leader have?
L’Heureux: PRC10. We were netted
and even that communication wasn’t too good. It was very
sporadic. Mostly communication was carried out by hand and arm
signals. Occasionally I’d have to get out from the vehicle to
talk to them and all this time there was a little bit of fire
going on. It increased steadily but we came out and were in the
process of being surrounded and we got a little bit
apprehensive. Up to this time the 50 or whatever it was, the 3-5
that had been firing at us the fire was returned by the 106.
Apparently which was halted, pieces of what were probably 57 mm
recoilless rifle rounds were found the next day in that area.
The fire kept up for about 4 hours. A platoon from Charlie
Company took about 8-10 casualties as I remember. At the time we
left, the counter attack was broken off slightly and that
platoon was entirely out of machine gun ammunition. Later Lt.
Robbins told me they were down about 2 magazines, 2 M14
magazines. We didn’t have any machine gun ammunition to give
them. Some of our 30 caliber were inoperative in that they would
only fire about 3 rounds at a time due to the fact that the
bolts were old, spare bolts were just as old and chipped. So if
the bolt was falling out, and it usually was the bolt, the only
thing to do was to change the bolt and hope the other bad ones
worked too. Which occasionally happened, it was difficult to do
under fire but we supported the best we could. We didn’t fire a
whole lot of 106’s because the general plan of the sweep was the
company to close around whichever platoon was hit first in an
attempt to enclose whatever forces contacted them. Since we had
no contact with the Company Commander, the only assumption we
could make was that the rest of the company was closing in
around. We didn’t want to fire in fear that we’d be firing into
our own lines, after a while it became obvious there were no
Marines around us so we fired 4 or five rounds from there.
Probably the radio communications went really bad at the time
the fire became the heaviest due to the large amount of rain
that started falling. This obliterated everything. Sight you
just couldn’t see further than 25 or 30 feet, it rained so hard.
Question: Speaking of
communications, was there any way you could communicate back to
the Battalion or Command Post for air support or additional
equipment?
L’Heureux: Only through the
Battalion tactic net, sir, as I said.
Question: You could not do that,
is that right? No communication with anyone….. Other than with
the platoon and the ONTOS, alright.
L’Heureux: No sir. I suppose I
remember about 4 hours after the action initiated, it slacked
off slightly and Lt Robbins wanted to keep contact because he
still assumed that the Company would try to finish and enclose
that force that had contacted. Just about that time, radio
communications started to come in. I was monitoring another
platoon from Alpha Company; somehow we had gotten word where the
rest of the Company was. They had found a large rice cache in a
village on the other side of the ridgeline surrounding that and
were attempting to wait and make the VC come and fight for the
rice. They were, the Company Commander was a little apprehensive
about where his platoon was. He was real glad to hear it was
still around and he also didn’t know where the ONTOS platoon
was. So I took my ONTOS and another and a number of casualties
back across the ridgeline, back over to where the Company was
deployed.
Question: How did you carry the
casualties?
L’Heureux: Set them on the arm
plate.
Question: Externally, right? How
many did you carry on the ONTOS?
L’Heureux: 4 on each one
Question: How seriously were
these men injured?
L’Heureux: Not very serious. The
worst I remember was shot right through the elbow. He was in
pretty much pain. He was the most severely injured one.
Question: Were you accompanied by
anyone when you returned with these two ONTOS?
L’Heureux: No sir. The Company
Commander then or Alpha Company told us to go back and get into
firing position and attempt to have Lt. Robbin’s platoon
extracted from the area since he was unwilling to leave that
much rice there. As I remember, about 5000 pounds and he didn’t
want to leave it because he was pretty sure they’d come and
snatch it away. As I remember, in the village there was nothing
but old men, women and children. Even old women, there were no
young women in the village. I did as he said, we went back and
extracted all the ONTOS, I called the rest of the ONTOS back
from the rice paddy with Lt. Robbin’s platoon with the
explanation that he was to walk up the ridgeline with John and
let us know when his people were clear of the treeline, mostly
bamboo and pine on the other side of the rice paddy where he was
taking most of his fire from. The contact was increasing
generally; apparently they knew it was a pretty small force
there. He withdrew finally on the side and fired up the
remainder of the ammunition except 2 rounds of the 106
ammunition that we saved for each of the ONTOS for the march
back to the Battalion area later on that night. We fired into
the treeline, about 50-75 feet above ground level.
Question: At what distance?
L’Heureux: This is about 400
meters, I would say. We fired, we were up off ground ourselves
along the ridgeline, it was about the only place we could get.
Matter of fact, we had our back against thatch huts. Clear the
people out of their huts. Their huts were destroyed as a result;
it was the only decent firing position. Matter of fact, it was
the only firing position available at all. The rest of the march
was….
Question: What success when you
said you fired into the treeline, did the infantry later move
into the treeline, what where the casualties?
L’Heureux: The area was swept out
again the next day. At that time, as I remember, about it was
about late in the evening 10 or 11 as I remember, and the orders
that came from the Battalion despite the Company Commander’s
request was to stay and see what else he could do. His orders
were to return, since it was a comparably small force. His
orders were to return and destroy the rice before he came, which
he did.
Question: I see, what I’m
interested in though, what affected your 106 firing into the
treeline? You said the following day that the area was swept and
there they found parts of bodies. About how many?
L’Heureux: They said about 20
bodies were there.
Question: In your estimation and
from the observation of the bodies there looked like they had
been sustained from your 106’s, is that right?
L’Heureux: As I remember it was
described to me that a lot of bamboo splintered in the bodies
and bodies that were just ripped apart.
Question: How many rounds did you
fire at this treeline, roughly?
L’Heureux: As I can remember, we
fired about between 6-8 from each ONTOS into the treeline.
Question: So in other words, you
fired about 30 rounds, single shot. I see. What did you aim at?
L’Heureux: Yes sir. Generally
speaking… It was just light enough to see to distinguish the
treeline from the rest of the rice paddy. Generally top of the
treeline and tried to split it across from where the muzzle
flashes were coming from.
Question: I see, in other words,
you tried to cover the area and you aimed at the areas where the
muzzle flashes were.
L’Heureux: Yes sir.
Question: What kind of rounds did
you fire?
L’Heureux: We fired high
explosive plastic tracer around.
Question: I see, then these
rounds were detonated when they struck the trees and bamboo and
the splintering effect from the bamboo caused additional
casualties, is that right?
L’Heureux: That was my
understanding
Question: Did you personally go
up and look over this?
L’Heureux: we were on another
sweep
Question: I see, well who did you
get this information from?
L’Heureux: As I remember the VS2
gave out some of this information in a briefing the next day and
I received from of this from a phone call.
Question: But in your opinion and
to your knowledge, there was no other type of weapons or no
infantry that fired into the area.
L’Heureux: There was a lot of
artillery fired in the area, later on. As the march back, we
attempted to cover on the flanks and the rear with artillery so
we could get back.
Question: So it is possible that
some of these casualties could have been sustained from the
artillery fire.
L’Heureux: Yes sir, that is very
possible. The march was without incident. There were 2 tanks
abreast in the front of the column, 2 tanks along the left flank
of the column, 5 ONTOS along the right flank of the column and 5
columns of infantry composed the column.
Question: Okay, I think we’re
through with this part.
L’Heureux: The rest of the
Operation GOLDEN FLEECE was, I remember were patrol action, as I
said, daily sweeps, generally Company sweeps and accompanied
blocking positions. ONTOS were used both with the moving element
and blocking positions, depending on the terrain,
traffic-ability and the size of the force, of the sweep force.
Patrol tactics in Vietnam that I had knowledge of stemmed from….
Question: Just the ONTOS…..
L’Heureux: Just the
ONTOS. Patrolling activity with the ONTOS was very very scarce.
Generally went out with platoon size patrol or larger combat
patrol. Where they were used generally as needed, although not
too much was done because it was inconvenient for the most part.
I know that the tanks were used a great deal to carry infantry
on patrol. Search and clear operations would, generally, block
reinforcements would be moved in the Marble Mountain area, south
of it by armored column using AmTrak and troops mounted tanks
moved in rapidly before daylight to be in a blocking position
before the sweeping element would commence. Sometime helicopters
were used. The ONTOS tactics had to be evolved, generally
although they were similar to tank infantry tactics. A number of
the tank infantry techniques could be utilized though mainly the
back blast of 106 recoilless rifle and the lack of a tank
infantry phone on the ONTOS would be very helpful thing to have.
Although it would have to be mounted in a different place. It
would greatly expedite communication with supportive units since
the visibility from the ONTOS is scarce to nonexistent. At the
time and the only opportunity it had to determine what time of
terrain it would cover and location of any target was to contact
men on the ground. Generally the tactics were that the ONTOS
would follow a line of infantry advancing from about 50 yards
behind. Tried to maintain contact with one fire team on an
individual and almost physical contact. With the fire team to
maintain their position and formation as best they could. And
this fire team would generally be far enough in advance to scout
out any terrain, deep pits or obstacles that would be difficult
to traverse. And they would also check out things in order to
give us some idea about where we could go and how to get there.
As far as firing went, high explosive plastic tracer was almost
exclusively used due to the fact that it went off easier since
it was detonated on any number of angles, where
inner tack almost had to hit a
hard surface and point detonated. You could get the plastic
tracer around and expect it to go off in any reasonably hard
ground, even sand. It would go off after but the heat rung would
not do this, it was just generally be a dud unless you hit
something very hard such as a bunker of something like. Which it
was used, it was suggested at least two heat rungs would be
carried in each ONTOS and I understand, this was later done for
the express purpose of eliminating bunkers and any hard type
targets. As I said, the patrolling activity of the ONTOS was
scarce and nonexistent.
Question: Speaking of ammunition,
will you elaborate any recommendations you have for any other
type ordinates?
Question: Speaking of ammunition,
will you elaborate any recommendations you have for any other
type ordinates?
L’Heureux: Well, from the
majority of the Platoon Commanders and ONTOS that I’ve talked
to, and my own feelings are that a white phosphorus rung would
be of great benefit. Due to the fact you could see the area, the
casual radius a lot easier to cover the target and correct off
your initial burst on target with a phosphorus rung. Also
there’s a lot of discussion about a tank type canister rung
which would be able to be used… well there’d be no limit on
their amount of use. Develop some kind of… not to harm the rifle
in any way. This would be a great advantage especially in the
heavy underbrush and thinks like this where the ONTOS could
actually get right in there and get close enough to fire, almost
directly such as a shotgun. Whereas with your AT rounds of the
ONTOS you don’t really care to get too close in the impact area
at all. I think with a canister type round, developed especially
for that area, you could really give a great deal more support,
matter of fact it would become possible to get in front of the
support infantry, in all. You’d have to be quite a ways in front
about 150 yards to be safe in any way. An area could really be
reduced effectively almost point blank range.
Question: Alright Lt, will you
tell me what success you had in crossing rice paddies when they
were flooded?
L’Heureux: It took a while to
develop the drivers themselves. They had not spent much time in
rice paddies, as a matter of fact, we had no one that had spent
much time in any of that type of terrain with the ONTOS. Drivers
developed rapidly, it soon became obvious that what would stop
an ONTOS was just a hill too steep to climb or a jungle too
think to penetrate at all. Almost any rice paddy could be
navigated if the terrain had not been chewed up previously by
AmTraks. They created great mounds of mud, I think due to
turning on an axis. Their tracks turned large stacks of mud.
This would block us by getting caught in the tracks and guards
and generally jamming everything up. If we were allowed to go
first, we could traverse any rice paddy I saw.
Question: And climb out?
L’Heureux: Yes sir. Generally the
best tactic we found, as I remember, it was in the book, was to
just keep moving. If you stop you were sure to get stuck or darn
close to get stuck. We moved all the way through the rice paddy
until you hit hard ground again or a section or a section of the
rice paddy that wasn’t flooded. We had no difficulty whatsoever.
Question: How quickly did you
move through the rice paddy?
L’Heureux: The actual speed was
3-4 miles an hour
Question: By walking speed
L’Heureux: Yes, all in low gear
Question: Describe the action in
the village when you went in unsupported.
L’Heureux: That occurred in late August 1965 or very early
September. We were attached to 2nd Battalion 9th Marines,
principally Hotel Company. Our mission was to go with Hotel
Company, as I remember they were sweeping the
Kam Na
Complex which is more or less
cut off from the regular land body by a river extending on one
side and a very deep stream on the other. Our mission was to try
to find a crossing path through the stream to get into the
complex and support Hotel 2-9 during their sweep. Attempts had
been made before I had understood to get across there and they
said just do what you could. See if you can get in there. Both
sides of the stream were very thick foliage, bamboo maybe 18 to
20 inches around, extending pretty high. We weren’t able to find
a place to cross and we were told just to stay in the salt flats
adjacent to the
Dong
Song 3, as I remember across
the railroad tracks and generally patrol around there to keep
anybody from coming along behind the Battalion disturbing us
during the sweep. While we were there, we received word from the
2nd Battalion 9th Marines Command Post to proceed, I think the
village’s name was
Lis
Song, although I’m not sure if
that’s what it’s called. Right south of
Dong
Song, the next village. I had 4
ONTOS at that time operative, we were told to go in there and
generally check the village out to see if there was anything
there.
Question: By yourself?
L’Heureux: Yes, by ourselves. We
had no infantry with us at all.
Question: How large was the
village?
L’Heureux: I’d say there were
abut 25-30 structures in the village, about 3-4 person size. The
railroad tracks ran right through the village, right down
through the middle. We travelled on the railroad bed for the
most part. As we entered the village, the lead ONTOS observed 15
or 20 men running from the other end of the village and it
appeared to be carrying weapons. He was given permission to fire
and did so. Although the majority of the fire that took place
was from the 30 caliber machine gun as usual, since at that
time, as I remember, confirmation was needed from the S-3
Battalion Commander to fire the 106. When all was said and done
the first 106 round was fired. One ONTOS later reported that he
had run one of the men down, he just literally ran over him and
as I remember, 26 or28 bodies left when we finished. Then men
had been running and jumping to a hole in the ground, apparently
a tunnel complex out there. After that was reported, we came
back into the village and it soon became obvious that there was
a rather large tunnel complex that extended all the way
underneath the village. One of the ONTOS in turning around had
collapsed part of the tunnel and had fallen in a large pit of
his own making due to the collapse. The rest of our activities
were literally flattening that village while it was reported
later It didn’t occur to us that later we were over extending
ourselves due to not having any infantry support whatsoever at
that time. And later on we hooked up again after sweep with
Hotel Company and spent the night.
Question: Going through the
village, I understand that you raced through it and went around
all the little streets, at what speed?
L’Heureux: Genneraly went pretty
fast, about 20 miles an hour.
Question: Were you firing your
machine gun at this time?
L’Heureux: No sir, it was all
very very close, just packed in there.
Question: Were you receiving fire
as you raced through it?
L’Heureux: No sir, there was no
fire.
Question: As I understand, your
vehicle did start them collapsing these tunnels, is that
correct?
L’Heureux: Yes sir, there was an
area, I’d say as large as 3/4 of a football field, something
like that.
Question: I see, Was this village
later checked over by the infantry?
L’Heureux: As I understand, it
was sir. The people went in there and examined the tunnel
complex, in their opinion was, just a local complex for the
protection of the villagers and the village itself from any fire
that was going on in the area. Because of the fact that it was
dug very deeply, most of the VC tunnels found were just under
the surface.
Question: Were you in
communication with the Battalion CP at the time you discovered
the first group of Viet Cong?
L’Heureux: No sir, not at that
time. Communication was reestablished immediately there after.
Question: I see, was there any,
was the Battalion 3 or CP giving you any instruction as to
wether you were to withdraw or remain there?
L’Heureux: No sir, we recorded it
and they said just to complete checking out the village and
return back to the salt flats by near Dong Song.
Question: How far away was the
Battalion Command Post?
L’Heureux: It was all the way
across the river, sir about 6 miles.
Question: I see, would it have
been possible, do you think, if you had had communication to
call for helicopter patrol to check it out?
L’Heureux: Anything is possible,
but at the time communications was reestablished and everything
had quieted down. There were just no people left in the area.
There wasn’t a living breathing soul any where around.
Question: Because of your
inferiority in numbers and strength, you did not make any
attempt to recover weapons or to do any further checking out, is
that correct?
L’Heureux: Yes sir, on the way
back, we looked generally from the turret to see if there were
any weapons there. We didn’t find any. At all
Question: Did you actually
receive any fire throughout the whole engagement?
L’Heureux: Yes sir, I’d say we
did. 25 or 30 rounds
Question: In that village?
Question: Did you actually
receive any fire throughout the whole engagement?
L’Heureux: Yes sir, I’d say we
did. 25 or 30 rounds
Question: In that village?
L’Heureux: Yes sir. When we first arrived in Vietnam, we
debarked from the ship and we were taken into relief the old 3rd
Battalion 9th Marines. That is 1st Battalion 9th Marines, to
relieve them and took over the ONTOS firing position on the
airstrip. As I remember, 2 companies on the airstrip, 2 ONTOS on
the south end of the airstrip and one on the north end. On the
south end of the airstrip, there was a bit of discussion about
the employment. The Company Commander who was in charge down
there wanted them deployed on the line and assign the primary
direction of fire, just as he would employ his machine guns.
Contrary to any advice that was given by myself and my ONTOS
Company Commander. This was done for a while. They dug down in
tank pits and stayed right shoulder to shoulder with infantry on
the line, as I said, against all advice. On July 3rd, when the
airfield was penetrated, it turned out the ONTOS was the only
thing able to stay on the line and continue firing through out
the fire, mostly muzzle flashes. No knowledge at all of any
casualties. Major caliber weapons were not fired at all. After
that more people were put around the airstrip and a
regular watch was set up. At which time we’re able to talk the
infantry Battalion into NOI’s to deploy. Another ONTOS
which was made around the airstrip back about 100-150 yards from
the wire itself and covered any area that there was decent field
of fire and also be able to deploy somewhat within the confines
of the wire barrier. One ONTOS was kept as a mobile force of
some kind, on alert throughout the night as well as a Platoon
tank. Major caliber weapons were never fired around the airstrip
due to the number of civilians living in the areas adjacent to
the airstrip. But it was felt strongly by everyone in ONTOS that
they should not be used as a machine gun, which was the general
consensus among the infantry at the time, although this attitude
later changed. Several bad experiences due to this happened to
Battalions in the field, 1st Battalion 1st Marines had an ONTOS
destroyed one night because it was left on a line too long
rather than kept to the rear of the main line itself, for some
kind of flexibility, it kept on a skyline just standing right
out there. It was destroyed by 57 mm fire. From that time on, to
my knowledge, it was never done anymore. ONTOS was put on the
line with infantry kept to the rear. The only other think I can
think to discuss are supply problems, which were acute. Almost
to the day we landed, before we deployed to Vietnam from
Okinawa, were a pretty…well, there was a noticeable shortage of
repair parts. At that time, something was wrong with the fan
belt in the ONTOS. The order had to be made with special
specifications, these had not yet arrived, we were using mighty
mike fan belts at the rate of 3-4 a day to keep things running.
All this took up quite a bit of time and maintenance caused a
few personnel problems due to wearing the troops out on constant
maintenance on the same thing. Also problems were had with the
alternators. I’m not sure of the exact technical nature, but I
know they were leaking, when the alternator starts leaking it
didn’t work anymore, you lose the battery charge. All this had
to be take care of. Generally the other problems are ones that
could be expected…spark plugs. There were no spark plugs there.
The only spark plugs in the Battalion were the ones I had to
scrounge from ARVN, ARVN Personnel Carry unit who used the same
engine.
We
later on got quite a few parts from them, traffic and spark
plugs which were at a premium.
I know for the motor transport I had attached to my platoon,
spark plugs again were a problem. Although that was the only
main problem, that I understand we had. The Army was very
helpful when we first got there and offering us any additional
help we could use on an unofficial basis. And later on, it
wasn’t actually during the rainy season, it was before that it
became noticeable that the tracks, when used long enough in the
wet, mud and rice paddy would begin to rot. Although there was
no outward indication, the track seemed firm enough. An ONTOS
would be running along then lose 3 sections of track all in the
same instance which would disable it. Each ONTOS normally
carried one spare section of track. Another problem with the
ONTOS, although the weight distribution relationship is
outstanding, allowing it to traverse all that terrain, the track
is extremely difficult to change since it requires a matching up
of a number of small holes and use of a thing called a track ax
which acts like a big pair of pliers, operated with a large bolt
and takes sometimes 4 to 5 hours to….., I have troopers staying
up all night to change a piece of track. I remember one
afternoon, after an operation, the track was broken by a tree
stump which a tree had been severed by a tank and the track hit
this and broke. It took almost 4-5 hours which held a lot of
troops in the field just to protect this one ONTOS while the
track was being repaired. It just became extremely difficult.
Another big problem was towing cables, there was not enough
towing cables to go around. Each ONTOS should carry at least one
towing cable and it should be better construction than the ones
they had out there because they just separate generally around
the plate and then many were old and the towing cables were not
all the same length which would make it difficult to tow. All
kinds of jury rigs arrangements had to be made if the towing
cables weren’t the same length. Generally the track problems got
pretty bad, a lot of tracks came in, tracks were used up
constantly. Perhaps consideration ought to be given for
development of a new type of track for the ONTOS. In spite of
the fact that the tracks we have now are efficient they are
extremely difficult to replace.
Question: What’s your overall
evaluation of the ONTOS in the environment such as Vietnam?
L’Heureux: Tactically, sir, it lends a great deal of support to
the infantry, although its drawbacks are mainly, the big
drawback is the maintenance factor, which is tremendous in
Vietnam and the back
way,
tactically is a big problem. You just have to work around it.
Question: Do you consider using
the same vehicle but a different type of ordinance on in it,
such as a machine gun or…?
L’Heureux: The weapons carrier
itself is sound and the 106 concept, I think is sound although
it has its drawbacks. I know that experiments have been made in
Phu Bak in mounting 50 caliber machine guns in place of 106
rifles, but the experiments were discontinued for some reason.
The only consideration that ought to be made to improve the
weapon is perhaps arming it with the automatic M79 weapon which
fires the 45mm grenade. I know they use it on helicopters. This
would be an outstanding type of thing to have on there. I would
like to see in place of the 30 caliber machine gun, a faster
firing weapon, such as the M60 or, even though it doesn’t have
faster firing it has more power, 50 caliber.
Question: Right, with the M60
machine gun you'd be able to exchange ammunition with any
supporting infantry units you might have.
L’Heureux: Yes sir, it became our
policy after this time to carry 5 boxes of ammunition in the
ONTOS, purely to give to the supporting infantry. It was almost
constantly used up once they found out we had it, they used it.
Question: Besides the M79 firing
device possible the canister round or white phosphorous round
for the 106 would be a tremendous improvement met in ordinance,
is that correct? As previously mentioned? Alright, thank you.
L’Heureux: Yes sir, I believe so.
The only after thought I’d be having would be the communications
aspect. I think definitely the AM59 or PRC10, which is used to
net with the infantry should be changed and the new PRC25 put in
there with its much greater range and also particularly due to
the fact that it has a lock on frequency. The PRC10 bought..a
change is required, for instance, say from a Company tact net,
which you’re supporting to a Battalion tact net, requires a new
calibration and it’s just almost impossible to achieve in a
moving vehicle and get anything at all also it’s just too darn
fragile to be any good at all. RT66 and PP12 work pretty well
but it’s very difficult to get aligned over there and due to the
fact that they get bounced around quite a bit and knocked out of
alignment almost immediately. So you wind up having little or no
communication at any range whatsoever. Again, I’d like to repeat
that I think of great used would be some type of tank infantry
phone. Probably the best place to mount it would be on the flank
on the ONTOS, far enough forward to keep the support infantry
out of the back light and still close enough to use the phone
throughout the firing.
|
My Vietnam Experience with an Ontos Unit
by Ralph Waring Beck
PFC Ralph Waring Beck, USMC Vietnam 1966
I was so
eager to become a Marine that I quit high school with only about
fourteen weeks to go before graduation and left for Marine Corps
Recruit Depot, San Diego, California to begin my recruit
training on 23 February 1965. While in Receiving Barracks
awaiting the formation of our Platoon, we were informed that the
first combat troops, two Battalions from the 9th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, arrived in Vietnam just north of Da Nang
on 8 March 1965. I graduated Marine Corps Boot Camp on 20
May 1965 with the other recruits in Platoon 313 and began
Infantry Training (ITR) with Company B, 1st Battalion, 2nd
Infantry Training Regiment, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton,
California on 23 May 1965. I fully expected to become a
“Grunt” (Infantryman) with an MOS (Military Occupational
Specialty) of 0311; however, I was surprised to find that upon
graduation from ITR I had been assigned an MOS of 0353 – Ontos
Crewman. I had no idea what an Ontos was, but it sounded
better than “Grunt”.
On 30 June 1965, I reported to Company
B, 1st Anti-Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton,
California. Two days later I took my “Boot Leave” and went
home to Wisconsin for the next twenty days. Upon returning
from leave, I fully expected to begin formal training at Camp
Delmar, California for Ontos Crewman School, but that was not to
be. On 3 August 1965 I was reassigned to Company A, 1st
Anti-Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division Reinforced, Fleet
Marine Force, Camp Pendleton, California. Just three days
later we embarked aboard the USS
Wexford County LST-1168
(Landing Ship Tank) at San Diego and headed for “Southeast
Asia”.
We were part of a four ship convoy
that left San Diego, California – made a brief stop at Midway
Island in the “middle” of the Pacific, where I celebrated my
18th birthday (14 August 1965). We crossed the
International Dateline on 16 August 1965 and continued our
voyage. When we got to Okinawa two of the ships in our
convoy continued on to Vietnam, but the
Wexford County,
along with one other ship, docked at White Beach, Okinawa, Japan
where we disembarked. For the next ten weeks we underwent
extensive “On the Job” (OJT) training with our Ontos. I
was trained as a Loader, but also learned how to drive and fire
all the weapons on the Ontos, and had some basic instruction in
vehicle maintenance. We also completed the Counter
Insurgency Guerrilla Warfare Training School at Jungle Lane,
Northern Training Area. We were based at Camp Hansen and
spent our time off frequenting the whores and bars in and around
Kin Village.
On 7 November 1965 I was re-assigned
to Headquarters & Service Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine
Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Reinforced, Fleet Marine Force,
and on 10 November 1965, the 190th birthday of the Marine Corps,
we embarked aboard the USS Oak
Hill LSD-7 (Landing Ship Dock),
headed for the South China Sea. We floated around for the
next week and rumors were rampant aboard ship. We were
going to Japan, or the Philippines, back to Okinawa, or on our
way to Vietnam. The issue was settled on 18 November 1965
when we disembarked at Red Beach, Da Nang, South Vietnam.
The previous day, three Battalions of Viet Cong and one
Battalion of North Vietnamese military troops overran a South
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) outpost at Hiep Duc. The outpost
overlooked Que Son Valley – a strategic area between Da Nang and
Chu Lai. Under attack, the ARVN abandoned their post and
left behind a large supply of weapons and ammunition, now in
enemy hands. It was going to be our job to help retake the
outpost.
The Ontos Commanders and Drivers
stayed with the vehicles aboard the USS
Oak Hill,
while the Loaders went ashore with the Grunts by climbing down
the rope ladders, into Amphibious Assault Landing Crafts (LCM-6)
and hit the beach in a typical World War II beach assault.
However, there was no opposition to our landing. The Ontos
were offloaded at Da Nang, and we joined up with our vehicles in
short order. We traveled south along Highway 1 toward Hoi
An, then Southwest toward Hiep Duc. The sides of the
roadway were lined with Vietnamese civilians who cheered and
waved as we made our way into battle. It was reminiscent
of films I saw as a child of Allied Forces liberating cities and
towns in Europe during World War II.
We were engaged in battle to retake
the ARVN outpost at Hiep Duc within hours of arriving in
Vietnam. We were re-designated Company A, 3rd Anti-Tank
Battalion Reinforced, 3rd Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force.
The Northeast monsoon season and weather conditions were at
their worst. In spite of the weather conditions, the
battle was joined by Marine Air Group-11 (MAG-11) providing F-4B
Phantom jets, and MAG-12 providing A-4 Skyhawks to conduct
airstrikes in support of the operation. MAG-16 and MAG-36
airlifted ARVN troops into the battle zone. The Marine
Infantry unit involved was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine
Regiment (3/7) from Chu Lai. Finally, two United States
Destroyers, the USS O’Brien
DD-725 and USS Bache
DD-470 provided fire support from their locations at sea.
In the first six days of the battle enemy combatant losses were
estimated to be 515 Killed In Action (KIA).
The enemy was routed from Hiep Duc, but
remained strong in the area. The Marines were kept on
alert and ordered to conduct “Search and Destroy” operations
while commanders planned a more detailed response. The
result was Operation Harvest Moon involving 2nd Battalion
7th Marine Regiment (2/7), 2nd Battalion 9th Marine Regiment
(2/9), and 3rd Battalion 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3), reinforced
with a Battery of 105mm Howitzers made up of elements of the
11th and 12th Marine Regiments. Also assigned to the operation
were Tanks, Amtracs and Ontos, comprising the balance of the
attack force, which was code named “Task Force Delta”.
Operation Harvest Moon was to be the largest combined operation
of the war since the Marines arrived in Vietnam the previous
March. Starting on 12 December, the B-52 Stratofortress
Bombers from the Air Force Base on Guam conducted bombing raids
throughout the night and into the early morning hours of 13
December. Operation Harvest Moon was officially ended on
20 December. In addition to the 515 enemy KIA prior the
start of Harvest Moon, the operation accounted for another 407
confirmed enemy KIA, 33 combatants captured and 60 tons of
ammunitions and other supplies were confiscated. Marine
losses were 45 Marines KIA, 218 Wounded in Action (WIA).
ARVN losses were 90 KIA and 141 WIA. Thus was my baptism
under fire – a combined total of well over a thousand
individuals on both sides losing their lives, and hundreds more
wounded.
After
Operation Harvest Moon we were relocated about 8 miles Northwest
of the Da Nang Airbase at a little outpost named Le My. It
was known as an enemy stronghold and our main objective was to
be a blocking force in an avenue that would protect the Da Nang
Airbase from attack. While there we had our share of
daytime patrols and night ambushes. The Ontos were set in
the hills and repositioned almost every night to avoid enemy
mortar rounds. Frequently we would take incoming small
arms fire from our North – on the opposite bank of the Ca De
River. On the evening of 22 January 1966, about twilight,
the enemy launched an assault on Le My. While standing in
front of my Ontos, I was struck by a round that ricocheted off
the vehicle, hitting me behind my left knee. Just as I was
hit my Ontos Commander, Staff Sergeant Gerald Ogle, or perhaps
my Driver, Lance Corporal Jimmy Rutherford, pulled me to the
ground, probably saving me from further injury. My wound
was slight, but it was a wake-up call for me.
Our Ontos
would rotate back to Company Headquarters every ten to fourteen
days for maintenance. Those trips were a welcome relief to
the hard conditions we faced at Le My. There we lived in
canvas tents with overturned ammunition boxes to form the deck.
The monsoon weather turned the ground throughout the area,
including inside our tents, to raging rivers. The rats and
centipedes made their homes in our racks, foot lockers, and
wherever they could to escape the weather. Showers and hot
meals were rare. In February 1966, after three months of
very difficult duty, I had the opportunity to take a job in the
Company Office as an Administrative Clerk. Apparently
typing was a rare skill, and that was enough to land me a new
assignment. From my new locale, I would frequently ride
shotgun on vehicles taking ammunition, fuel, mail and other
supplies to my old friends still in the field. Those
rides, while sometimes punctuated with sniper fire, were much
safer than being assigned to an Ontos Crew out in the sticks.
However, one particular ride became the most memorable of my
life.
Trying to
find a “shortcut” to our destination, three of us were in a jeep
carrying mail. Our weapons were holstered or on the deck
of the jeep. The “road” turned into a trail, and then
almost disappeared into the jungle. We were putt-putting
along at just a couple miles per hour on some awfully rough
terrain making a wide turn to the right, when out of the jungle
stepped three Vietcong, their weapons at the ready. They
stood frozen just a few feet to our left, and our eyes locked as
we slowly drove past them. The tallest of the three,
standing in the center, was carrying a Browning Automatic Rifle
(BAR). He let us get about fifteen yards past them, and he
let loose with a burst of eight to ten rounds just over our
heads, and let out a huge laugh that seemed way out of
proportion for his size. We just kept inching along and
somehow made it back to our outpost. I have been haunted
by this experience ever since it occurred. I just cannot
understand why he and his comrades didn’t just kill us on the
spot. They would have had our jeep, uniforms, weapons,
radios, and the supplies we were carrying, and we were
completely helpless to defend ourselves. What bothers me
the most is that I believe if the situation had been reversed, I
would not have been so compassionate. I would have taken
their lives with little or no hesitation. Over the years,
I have often prayed for the salvation of that enemy soldier, so
one day I could meet him in heaven and thank him for sparing the
life of a stupid kid Marine, and my friends.
I was due to
rotate back to the United States in September 1966, and received
orders to report to the 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton,
California. Having more than two years to go on my
enlistment, I was sure that I would spend a short time at
Pendleton, and would soon find myself back in Vietnam for
another tour of duty. Therefore, I decided to extend my
current tour by 90 days in exchange for any duty station “East
of the Mississippi River”. My extension was approved and I
settled in for the next three months working in the company
office.
What I didn’t
know was our entire Company was about to move North to the area
around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In August 1966
Operation Prairie began to establish and maintain a blocking
force along the southern edge of the DMZ to prevent the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) from crossing the DMZ at will. Since
every Marine is first and foremost an infantryman, my new job as
administrative clerk did little to keep me out of danger.
We traveled north along Highway 1 to Dong Ha, then West along
Highway 9 and finally settled at Camp J. J. Carroll. On
the way we encountered double and triple canopy jungle, but when
we arrived at Camp Carroll it was as barren as the landscape of
the moon. We had dumped enough Agent Orange and other
toxins on the land to kill everything that grew. My last
three months in Vietnam were similar to my first three.
Cold, wet, tired, hungry, enjoying the monsoons along with the
smell of gun powder and napalm. Operation Prairie ended
with more than 100 Marines KIA, 200 WIA and 1300 enemy KIA.
Fortunately, I was spared much of the action of that operation,
as it covered such a large geographical area and I was involved
for less than half the time it was taking place.
Nevertheless, I was more than ready to see 18 December 1966 come
around and my return home.
The last two
years of my active duty enlistment were spent at Marine Air
Reserve Training Detachment, Marine Air Reserve Training
Command, Naval Air Station, Grosse Ile, Michigan. I
continued in my job as Administrative Clerk and trained Marine
Reservists as my primary assignment. There were only about
ninety active duty Marines on the base. Other duty
included providing military funeral honors for Marines KIA whose
home of record was in and around Detroit, Michigan. I went
on countless funerals, and in some cases, the duty was worse
than serving in Vietnam. I was frequently overtaken by
guilt, as I lay to rest fellow Marines who paid the ultimate
price for all of us to enjoy “life as usual” back in “The
World”.
During the
years that followed my service in Vietnam I have made four
humanitarian missionary trips back to Vietnam, two of them with
my wife, Lynn. I have helped in the construction of three
medical clinics and one children’s playground on those trips.
I also revisited all the areas where I served as a young Marine.
I have found my purpose in life doing volunteer work helping
veterans, their families and supporting their causes. In
Vietnam I made friends that have lasted a lifetime, and remember
those who became causalities of war. To this day I am
friends with our Company Corpsman, Ric “Doc” Gardiner, and a few
others that I count among my blessings: Rick Murdie, Pat
“Frenchy” Canulette, Gary “Lightening” Hartman, John “Pi-man”
Paiva, Dana Hunter, John “Sergeant” Williams, and Steve Valdez.
I have had brief encounters with others and would like to build
deeper friendships with them: Elwood “Woody” Carpenter, Robert
“Bob” Becker, David “Dave” Stegmeier, and Daniel “Danny” Welch.
Whenever I am able to visit The Wall I pause to remember some of
those we left behind: Greg Weaver – KIA 26 May 1966, Robert
“Bob” Gage – Missing In Action (MIA) 3 July 1966 (body not
recovered), Raul Orta – KIA 1 February 1967, Philip Sauer – KIA
24 April 1967, Wayne Hayes – KIA 6 July 1967 and some 17 others
that served with Ontos units that were KIA sometime during my
tour from November 1965 to December 1966.
M-50A1 Ontos
Le
My Outpost, Viet Nam 1966
Company A, 3d Anti-Tank Battalion, 3d Marine Division
|
REBUILDING OF A M50A1,
ONTOS
By Michael Scudder
How the project found me.
It all started innocently enough, I
read an article on the Ontos in a military vehicle magazine. The
article reminded me of my contacts with the Ontos while serving
as a Marine infantryman. I thought it was great that the Marine
Corps had adopted a hot rod tank (OK anti tank). It was fast,
quick turning and had the best exhaust tone of anything in our
era. It also had more fire power from its six 106 mm recoilless
rifles than the main battle tanks. The Ontos crews were known to
bring ammo, water, food and mail when the needs arose. The
little tank was always a welcome sight.
My reading of the Ontos article
coincided with seeing Jack Tomlin’s ad for an Ontos chassis
along with pallets of parts. I began to wonder how difficult it
would be to build an upper hull for the chassis and end up with
an Ontos look-a-like. I was soon to be retired and I needed a
good project. This was to be a great project.
I then had a conversation with Bill
Watson of Greensboro, NC about buying one of his restored M274
mules. In a “by the way” conversation, I asked Bill his opinion
about the building of an upper hull on the Ontos chassis. Bill
then laid the bombshell on me. He said he had a running Ontos
chassis in the chicken house on his father’s old farmstead. He
said the chassis had been converted into a test boring machine.
Bill had swapped a mule for the machine. He enjoyed taking the
kids for rides in it.
It was more than 6 months later when
my wife and I traveled from Houston, Texas to Greensboro, NC to
pick up the mule. I was focused on seeing Bill’s running Ontos
chassis. After meeting Bill and completing the purchase of the
mule, I got directions to the farm and chicken house. There it
was…..covered in dust, chicken feathers and chicken s……..
(droppings). Most of my memories of military service are of
Chicken s……. (droppings). It was a match made in heaven.
Bill also told me about some parts
Ontos at White Owl Military Parts in Kinston, NC. White Owl had
purchased some Ontos chassis that had been converted into
fire buggies for the transport of fireman and equipment for the
forest service. He suggested that I call a former Marine who
traveled to White Owl often. Maybe he might take some photos of
what may be available.
A call to White Owl’s Jerry Hill
revealed: 1. Yes, the yard had several Ontos chassis in an
overgrown section of the yard. 2. No, he could not take photos
of them as it would take too much tree cutting to even find them
much less photograph them. 3. If I wanted more information, I
should travel to White Owl and look for myself. I did.
Next I called the former Marine, Gunny
Sergeant David Macgillivary of Jacksonville, NC. This old salt
was well known in military vehicle circles for putting his
military vehicles in the movies. I asked him if he would take
some photos of the Ontos hulls for me.
Gunny Dave did travel to White Owl and
took a photo of the only Ontos chassis that was not buried in
the overgrowth. It was missing the rear 2/3 of the hull and
turret. It had a 2” diameter tree growing in the gunner’s area.
Based on the photo, I booked air fare to NC.
Dave and I agreed to meet at White
Owl. I rented a car and bought a machete at a local hardware.
Dave brought bush cutters. It was a perfect day for two retired
guys to play Tarzan in the woods: 90 degrees, 90 % humidity, and
not a breeze within two states. We spent 4 hours just finding
the seven Ontos chassis and cutting away enough brush to get a
photo of one side. Three of the chassis had some part of the
sloping front armor left intact. It wasn’t much, but it was more
parts than I had hoped for. The iron had been in the yard for
about 12 years. White Owl wanted to clean up this part of the
yard, so I was able to purchase all seven Ontos for a sale
price. Sale is my word and not one my wife may have used.
I returned to Texas to decide how many
chassis I should attempt to haul home. I also needed a brain
damaged 18 wheeler driver that would take his rig into Bill
Watson’s fields to get the chicken house chassis. I concluded I
could only haul 4 chassis. The remaining four would be inflicted
on Gunny Dave who suffered from the Ontos virus also.
A neighbor had used the services of
“Freddy the trucker” to maneuver his large rig into hay fields.
He was what I was looking for: skilled, fearless and brain
damaged from years of country dancing in Baptist county. Freddy
had been a bull rider and rodeo clown and he had as many old
stories as I had old jokes. We would spend six days in his old
truck picking up three chassis from White Owl and one from Bill
Watson.
Loading the three chassis from White
Owl was an ordeal for everyone involved. The weather had managed
to get even hotter than on my first visit. One of my chassis was
in a swampy section of the yard and
the clutch-challenged folk lift refused to perform. Everyone was
nearing heat exhaustion when a trusty 5 ton truck utilized its
front winch to extract the last chassis without any strain. The
folks at White Owl were great people to deal with and they made
me feel at home.
The next morning found Freddy and me
nearing Bill Watson’s farm. Bill had arranged a small crane to
lift the chicken house chassis onto the 18 wheeler. Bill and I
had guessed the chassis to weigh about 6,000 pounds. The crane
was chosen based on this guess. We guessed wrong-real wrong. The
Ontos got 3” off the ground when the lift stalled. The operator
made a more educated guess at 11,000 pounds and a new selection
of lifting equipment was ordered.
The selection of an off-loading crane
in Texas was done with considerably more knowledge than
guesswork. I arrived in my pasture after six days of transport
with 42,000 pounds of rusted junk: none of which looked like an
Ontos. A small crowd of neighbors, who were observing the off
loading, were now discussing my mental stability.
The Ontos chassis were off loaded from
the trailer into 25 acres of cow pasture adjacent to my house
and shop. The chicken house Ontos was to be the basis of the
first project. I pulled the Ontos towards my shop using my 40 HP
farm tractor. It could pull it in a straight line as long was no
steering brakes were applied. Turns were affected by pulling on
a corner of the machine until it pivoted in the new direction. I
got the chassis within a few yards of the shop and exchanged the
electric fuel pump. The engine came to life and, after taking
the bark off a nearby oak tree, the machine was driven into the
shop.
I had a running chassis in the shop.
The second non-running chassis had been a fire buggy but
not run in 12 years. This machine was left in the pasture near
enough to the shop to act as a parts donor should the need
arise. The engine had been exposed to the weather. The two other
machines were without tracks and missing suspension parts, but
these hulls had the sloping front armor and many spare parts.
My biggest challenge on this project
is one that many of the readers are familiar - rust. The
machines had been in poor storage for years and few bolts could
be removed. The 2” diameter tree that had grown in my main donor
machine had its roots threaded throughout the ammo locker. I
would later get a turret on a parts exchange from a military
museum. Only the casting survived the years. Even those parts
made from plate iron were unsalvageable. That is the reason
rebuilders are loved by plate and machine shops. I performed all
the plate work, but the machine shop and a sheet metal shop did
some damage to my bank account.
I removed about 1,000 pounds of the
non-military steel body that had been overlaid on the armored
bottom hull. The floor had large torch cut holes and the rear
ammo door was cut out by torch. After sand blasting, painting
and parts swapping, I laid the front armor on the bottom
chassis. It may not have looked like an Ontos yet, but it was
starting to look military.
At this same time Gunny Dave had
located a supply of decommissioned 106mm recoilless rifles in
Bedford, Indiana. We purchased 12 rifles and four M8 .50 caliber
spotting rifles. Dave transported the rifles on his flat-bed
trailer. There was no concern that the purchase could be
identified as former weapons. The load looked like a load of old
oil drill pipe. The guns were torch cut in half with about 2”
removed. The breaches, muzzles and chambers had torch cuts. The
spotting rifles were cut in half through the barrels and
receivers. The cut barrels still had packing paper in them.
These barrels had never been fired. The building of parade guns
from these parts was straight forward.
I mocked up the missing rear hull
plates with 1/2” plywood which then acted as patterns for the
steel fabrication. The two rear doors were cut by measurement as
a single door. After the doors were finished fabricated and hung
on hand built hinges, I cut the doors into two pieces by torch.
This simplified the door alignment. These doors have a
horizontal bend at the bottom 1/3. This bend was duplicated by
sitting the doors over two timbers while I used a friend’s
19,000 pound dozer to apply the bending force through the
dozer’s blade. I have since learned that this technique is
common in this part of Texas.
As you may understand, the original 12
gage fenders had a wrinkle or two. I found the best way to
straighten them was to clamp them to a steel I beam and pound
them straight with progressively smaller hammers, starting with
a sledgehammer and ending with a body man’s bumping hammer.
The turret was a study in rust. I used
every technique known to man to include: sand and shot blasting,
hammering, needle descalers, wire brushing, water blasting. It
took two days of hand work to get the gunner’s hatch to open and
close. In the end it looked fine - from 20 feet away. I had to
fabricate those parts that were on the outside of the turret
including the steel straps that hold the gun to the turret’s
revolving arms.
The original rubber bladder gas tank
was removed and replaced with a standard 5 gal. jeep can
converted to act like a boat’s fuel tank (with small rubber pump
bulb). The can is mounted on the outside of the vehicle in a
spot where a water or oil can was often mounted. The can has a
quick disconnect fitting and seems to function well. The gas can
then be removed when the vehicle is to be shown inside a public
building. I will replace the gas can for a water can while being
shown.
I am nearing the end of this seven
year rebuild. There were many periods of little or no
activity-little or no money, but the project has been great and
brought me in contact with many former Ontosmen who I consider
friends.
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Where? Here’s a Few Clues
By the end of 1967 the Ontos were
reaching the end of their sustainability on the battle field.
The 2 Ontos Battalions ceased to exist; the Ontos were
consolidated into a single reinforced antitank company and
placed, one each, into a tank battalion for administrative and
most operational control.
A year later, the Marines
deactivated their Ontos units and the vehicles were handed over
to the Army’s light infantry brigade. The Army used them until
their parts ran out and then employed them as bunkers. What
happened to them after that is largely unknown.
Ironically, excess Ontos were
given to Army forces (recall that the Army initially rejected
the Ontos as being unsuitable for its requirements). These Army
Ontos went to Company D, 16th Armor, 173rd Airborne Brigade. The
Army used its Ontos until they ran out of spare parts; then
employed them in fixed bunkers.
After Vietnam, some were
handed over to civilian agencies and used as forestry vehicles.
A tiny number made it into collectors’ hands. Some are in
museums. According to Mike Scudder, a former Marine who owns
several, there are more World War I tanks in circulation than
there are Ontos. This may not actually be true, since “there are
believed to be more than 60 Ontos sitting discarded in the
desert on a Marine Corps reservation near China Lake, Calif. If
they are still there, no one is saying.” (Brendan McNally’s
12Feb13 article
M50 Ontos: The Forgotten Tank-killer)
Upon return to the United States, the tops of the
vehicles were removed. Many of the chassis were sold for use as
construction equipment or give to local governments for rescue
work. One “platoon” of surplus M50s wound up in the service of
the North Carolina Forestry Service for use as fire fighting
vehicles. According to Vietnam veteran and former Ontos Marine
Mike Scudder, Ontos today are scarce. Scudder should know: he
bought seven rusty sections from North Carolina and is restoring
two of them. More than 60 Ontos are believed to be stored in the
desert at the Marine Corps facility, Naval Air Warfare Center,
China Lake, CA. (From article written by Peter Brush)
John Williams:
I know that some Ontos were sold to the South Carolina Dept. of
Forestry. They were used on the fire line to transport men
and firefighting materials to areas that could not be reached by
rubber tired vehicles. After this use they were sold for
scrap.
Jim Renforth:
Rumor has it, some of the boys from "Duck Dynasty" may have
(perhaps) picked up a few of them to use as ready-made 'duck
blinds'. Purely rumor, mind you, and the accuracy of this may
well justify a site visit or two (or more). But, geez - who
knows for sure?
Bob Peavey:
Many Ontos were
bought by the Land Bureau and had cages welded around them. The
large number of Ontos were given, believe it or not, to the U.S.
Army when we left Vietnam. There were two units that received
them, I used to know the unit designations but forgot. I'll see
if I can find it again.
D.C. Satcher:
“Ugly ONTOS is Underrated”, Nov 1969: “…. The last one (in
Vietnam) was removed to Okinawa.
Brendan
McNally: “M50 Ontos: The
Forgotten Tank-killer”, Feb 2013: “A
year later (1969), the Marines deactivated their Ontos units and
the vehicles were handed over to the Army’s light infantry
brigade. The Army used them until their parts ran out and then
employed them as bunkers. What happened to them after that is
largely unknown.
Mike Scudder:
I can confirm that about 50 Ontos are now at the China Lake
Naval Range. The Camp Pendleton's Museum of Transportation
received three Ontos, three years ago, that had known combat
histories from China Lake. It took much political pull to have
the Navy release them and it is doubtful any more will leave the
base. Jerry Cook is the main force in getting these released.
He acts as a volunteer at the museum. Since writing my paper on
my rebuilding, I made a swap with the museum and got a more
complete turret that had seen action at Hue City. Rick States of
NY/Long Island has collected four or more chassis and a damaged
but almost complete Ontos that had escaped from China Lake many
years ago. Rick is a great collector, but I know of no wrench
turning being done with the exception of an engine rebuild. Rick
has set up a museum in a building in Up State NY. I have sold,
and have attempted to mentor a young man from Greenville, TX, a
lower chassis and parts machine with some frontal armor. It is
my hope that he can do what I have done with C22. It requires
the hand making of many parts.
MUSEUM
OF THE MARINES, Jacksonville, NC contact Sgt Maj Houle.
This was one of the chassis I gave Gunny Dave Macgilvary.
He got it running and the Sgt Major had the Camp Lejeune hobby
shop do much work on it. It ran, but had no interior when
I saw it last.
AMERICAN MILITARY MUSEUM, S. El Monte, CA. This
Ontos is pretty complete less guns.
ROCK
ISLAND ARSENAL MUSEUM, Rock Island, Il. This is a
prototype Ontos and differs in many details from the production
Ontos.
MCB 29
PALMS has a static display Ontos on the north side of
the road into the base.
PATTON
MUSEUM Ontos is owned by the Army and in good storage at
Ft Benning and sometimes used as a teaching tool for young Army
officers. It will be moved to Washington, DC when the Army
builds its National Museum.
NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE MARINE CORPS The Ontos has been
gutted of its running gear and interior. It was restored
by Air Force volunteers. It has the wrong shade of
paint. .
MUSEUM
OF THE FORGOTTEN WARRIOR, 5865 A Road, Marysville,
CA. The museum has plastic pipe representing the
guns. The website shows an interesting collection.
Don Schrader said he would open the museum if after hours at
530-682-0674
MUSEUM
OF THE AMERICAN GI College Station, Texas.
Brent Mullins is finishing an A+ restoration of an Ontos
received from Jerry Cook at the Camp Pendleton Museum. It
should be finished during the first few months of 2016
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A PDF photo
article of surviving Ontos
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