

[REDACTED]  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

HEADQUARTERS  
Battalion Landing Team 2/7  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
APO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/AGB/mar  
3000  
1 Sep 1968  
Ser. No. 0040-68

2 Bn. 7th Marines  
Log No. **00150-68**  
Copy No. 37 of 55

[REDACTED]  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo  
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 Aug 1968  
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8  
(c) 9th Mar BrigO 5750.8

Encl: ✓(1) Battalion Landing Team 2/7 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b), and (c) enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

*L. E. Watson*  
L. E. WATSON

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BLT 2/7

(MID) CHRON

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BATTALION LANDING TEAM  
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1 - 31 Aug 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATAPERIOD COVERED

1 - 31 Aug 1968

A. UNIT DESIGNATION

1. Battalion Landing Team 2/7  
Company E

Company F  
Company G

Company H  
H&S Co (-) (Rein)

2nd Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Tank Bn  
3rd Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th AT Bn  
2nd Plat (Rein), Co A, 1st MT Bn  
2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
3rd Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd Amtrac Bn  
1st Plat (Rein), Co E, 1st Recon Bn  
C & C Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Med Bn  
Det, 1st SP Bn  
Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div  
Det, Hq Co, 7th Mar  
Det, LSU, For Log Cmd

LtCol. L. E. WATSON  
Lt. S. R. MATULICH

1-7 Aug 1968

Capt. J. T. FRICKER  
8-31 Aug 1968

Lt. G. W. HUMPHREY  
Lt. G. HEATLY

1-12 Aug 1968

Capt. A. V. LATTORE  
13-31 Aug 1968

Capt. T. P. E. HOLM  
Capt. T. A. WILLIAMSON

1-11 Aug 1968

Lt. J. H. HALSEY II  
12 Aug 1968

Capt. R. R. WELPOTT  
13-31 Aug 1968

Lt. M. E. HASTINGS

Lt. D. L. BROWN

Lt. E. T. CHARBONNEAU

Lt. D. C. PATTERSON

Lt. M. E. NELSON

Lt. W. H. MCCLOSKEY

Lt. (MC) J. M. SEXAUER, USN

Lt. L. J. STEVENS

WO W. PICKARSKI

Sgt. J. L. KAVANAUGH

Lt. J. E. MCDANIELS

## 2. Attached Units

Btry H, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Mortar Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Lt. J. R. GILL

Capt. G. D. BERGER

1-5 Aug 1968

Lt. C. B. THOMAS JR

6-31 Aug 1968

ENCLOSURE (1)

B. STAFF OFFICERS

XO

S-1

S-2

S-3

S-4

Personnel Officer  
 Embarkation Officer  
 Communication Officer  
 Air Liaison Officer  
 Supply Officer  
 Motor Transport Officer  
 Chaplain  
 Medical Officer

Maj. E. M. DUNN

Lt. J. M. CARTER

Lt. J. R. PIPPEN

Maj. J. R. RUFFINI

1-25 Aug 1968

Maj. L. J. DESJARDINES

26-31 Aug 1968

Capt. D. W. CHAMBERLAIN

1-7 Aug 1968

Lt. P. S. MENAGH

8-31 Aug 1968

Lt. R. HARRELLE

Lt. P. S. MENAGH

Lt. T. T. DABNEY

Capt. P. H. MCKINNIS

Lt. R. D. DODSON

Lt. L. A. RAYMOND

Lt. (CHC) B. LOVEJOY, USN

Lt. (MC) M. A. NAPONIC, USN

C. LOCATION1. BLT 2/7

- a. 1-16 Aug 1968: Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN.
- b. 17-21 Aug 1968: Operation MAMELUKE THRUST, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN.
- c. 22-24 Aug 1968: Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN.
- d. 25-31 Aug 1968: First Marine Division. DANANG RVN.

2. Detachments

- a. Co H, BLT 2/7: 111400H-161730H Aug 1968 to 7th Marines
- b. Co E, BLT 2/7: 232130H-251500H Aug 1968 to 5th Marines
- c. Mortar Btry, 3/11: 232130H-241900H Aug 1968 to 5th Marines

ENCLOSURE (1)

- d. Co F, BLT 2/7: 232130H-281200H Aug 1968 to 3rd Amphibian Tractor Bn.
- e. Co E, BLT 2/7: 281630H Aug 1968 to present to 1st Marine Division (Southern Sector Defense Command).
- f. Co G, BLT 2/7: 281630H Aug 1968 to present to 1st Marine Division (Southern Sector Defense Command).
- g. Co H, BLT 2/7: 281800H Aug 1968 to present to 3rd Bn, 1st Marines.

3. Attachments

None

D. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
63	1,602	8	69

ENCLOSURE (1)

## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-24 August 1968 BLT 2/7 participated in Operation ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST (see TAB A).

During the period 25-31 August 1968 BLT 2/7 was committed to the DANANG Tactical Area of Responsibility. Company F was helilifted to 3rd Amphibian Tractor Bn on 23 Aug 1968 and the remainder of the BLT was lifted to 1st Tank Bn area on 24 and 25 Aug 1968. Companies F and H and the Alfa Command Group, under the OPCON of 7th Marines, moved to DIA LA PASS (AT939748) on 28 Aug 1968. From there, Company H, under OPCON of 3rd Bn, 1st Marines, was transported to Hill #60 (AT886773), where they remained for the remainder of the reporting period. Companies E and G remained under OPCON of 1st Marine Division and continued to augment 1st Tank Bn's defensive forces, establishing company combat bases in the vicinity of Hill #70 (AT955725). BLT 2/7 also provided ground forces for CAO DO Bridge (AT995705) and TUY LOAN Bridge (AT 946700) during the remainder of the reporting period.

On 19 August 1968 ARG shipping sailed for Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, where from 21-29 Aug 1968 a modified rehabilitation and training program was conducted for that BLT equipment and some 335 personnel still embarked aboard the ARG shipping. While at Subic Bay, all equipment and personnel aboard the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and USS THOMASTON (LSD-28) were disembarked and reembarked aboard the USS OGDEN (LPD-5) and USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35).

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED

1. For missions assigned during the period 1-24 Aug 1968 see PART IV - Combat After Action Report (Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST).
2. During the period 24-31 Aug 1968, BLT 2/7 was moved to DANANG, RVN to augment the defense of the forces of the Southern Sector Defense Command.

B. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

1. Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK - QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN - 010001H-241200H Aug 1968. During the period 170600H-210800H Aug 1968 the BLT forces that constituted Operation ALLEN BROOK consisted of Company H, Mortar Btry 3/11, one 81mm Mortar section, an Engineer unit, and an H&S Company unit. This reduction in force was due to the remainder of the BLT participating in Operation MAMELUKE THRUST.
2. Operation MAMELUKE THRUST - QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN - 170600H-210900H Aug 1968.

C. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY AND WEAPONS CAPTURED

1. 1-24 Aug 1968

(see TAB A)

2. 25-31 Aug 1968

None

D. CASUALTIES SUSTAINED

1. USMC

<u>Officer</u>				<u>Enlisted</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>WIANE</u>	<u>NBCE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>WIANE</u>	<u>NBCE</u>
2	8	3	3	18	128	21	159



2. USN

<u>Officer</u>				<u>Enlisted</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>WIANE</u>	<u>NBCE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>WIANE</u>	<u>NBCE</u>
0	0	0	0	0	5	1	6

E. NEW TECHNIQUES

None

F. COMMAND RELATIONS

- a. 031200H BLT 2/7 Chopped to 5th Marines ✓
- b. 111400H Chop Co H, BLT 2/7, to 7th Marines ✓
- c. 161730H Assumed OPCON Co H, BLT 2/7 ✓
- d. 232130H BLT 2/7 Chopped to CG First Marine Division
- e. 232130H Chop Co E, BLT 2/7 and Mortar Btry, 3/11, to 5th Marines
- f. 232130H Chop Co F, BLT 2/7 to 3rd Amtrac Bn
- g. 241900H Assumed OPCON Mortar Btry, 3/11 ✓
- h. 251500H Assumed OPCON Co E, BLT 2/7 ✓
- i. 281200H Assumed OPCON Co F, BLT 2/7 ✓
- j. 281630H BLT 2/7 Chopped to 7th Marines ✓
- k. 281630H Chop Co E, BLT 2/7, and Co G, BLT 2/7, to CG First Marine Division
- l. 281800H Chop Co H, BLT 2/7, to 3rd Bn, 1st Marines ✓

G. EQUIPMENT

One M-151, one TD-15, and one M-83 were submitted to 1st FSR for repair during this reporting period. One M-109 remained at 1st FSR from the previous month. Other repair parts for BLT equipment and vehicles were obtained by the Logistic Support Unit. 2nd and 3rd echelon maintenance was performed by the BLT LSU contact teams.

H. LOGISTICS

1. The TAC-LOG for Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK was aboard the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) until 18 Aug 1968 when the ship sailed for Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.
2. August opened with the LSA located at the 27th Marines C.P. On 9 Aug 1968, the LSA was moved to the 5th Marines C.P. at AN HOA. The LSA was subsequently moved to DIA LA PASS on 28 Aug 1968.

ENCLOSURE (1)

3. During the reporting period an inspection was conducted by a 9th MAB representative and included the BLT's Logistic, Supply, and Embarkation status. The results of the inspection showed an overall rating of satisfactory.
4. On 16 Aug 1968 a Food Service Section was established at AN HOA, and from 17-28 Aug 1968, the section prepared two meals per day/ 200 portions per meal for the BLT Rear at AN HOA. In addition one meal of 500 portions per meal were served to the troops at GO NOI Island, on 18 and 19 Aug 1968. However, the tactical situation precluded delivery of a hot meal after 19 Aug 1968. At DIA LA PASS on 30 and 31 Aug 1968, two meals of 500 portions were served each day to the troops in that area.
5. From 19-29 Aug 1968 a modified rehabilitation and training program was conducted at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines for the BLT equipment and personnel still embarked aboard ARG shipping. While at Subic Bay all equipment and personnel aboard the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and USS THOMASTON (LSD-28) were disembarked and re-embarked aboard the USS OGDEN (LPD-5) and USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35). During the rehabilitation period, first, second, and third echelon maintenance was performed on organic vehicles.
6. Supply items for the BLT in-country were obtained from the organization to which the BLT was OPCON, with the exception of Class II items, which were obtained from the Force Logistics Command. Supplies for the BLT units at Subic Bay were obtained either from Naval Supply Depot or through Self-Service.

#### I. CIVIC ACTION

No significant Civic Action projects were undertaken by the BLT during this reporting period. Operations SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK and MAME-LUKE THRUST were conducted in areas either known to be enemy infested or cleared of all friendly civilians. This type of operation does not lend itself to a program of Civic Action activities nor does it require these types of activities.

#### J. ADMINISTRATION

##### 1. Awards

This organization submitted the following recommendations for awards during the period covered by this report:

ENCLOSURE (1)

- (a) Two double Amputees recommended for Bronze Stars
- (b) 8 Gallantry Cross recommendations from Operation EAGER  
YANKEE/HOUSTON IV.

2. Legal and Discipline

During this period Non-judicial punishment was awarded in five instances. There were four Special Court Martials awarded and three Marines confined during the month.

3. Postal

Mail service during the period improved. However, availability of helicopter transportation for mail and designated mail clerks was often sporadic during the month of Aug. due to over riding operational commitments. There were two mail deliveries made to the BLT personnel at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands on 23 and 26 Aug 1968 respectively.

4. R&R

There were 113 R&R quotas allotted to the BLT for the month of August.

5. Promotions

Meritorious promotions by the SLF Commander were 2 Sergeants and 2 Corporals. Regular promotions effected during the month were one to Master Sergeant, one to Staff Sergeant, and 18 Corporals, 1 to Lance Corporal, and 4 to Private First Class.

6. Pay and Allowances

Pay call was held on 15 Aug 68 for personnel in the field and on 16 Aug 68 for personnel at BLT Rear (AN HOA). Next pay call will be held on 3 Sep 68.

7. Post Exchange

Ship's store provided ample exchange items. While in the field, health and comfort items were available from sundry packs distributed on a regular basis.

ENCLOSURE (1)

8. Personnel Change

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
a. Losses				
Battle	2	18	0	0
Administrative (Transfers, Rotations, MEDEVACS)	7	71	0	4
b. Replacements	10	182	0	5

9. Religious Services

a. Divine Services

<u>Date</u>	<u>Type Service</u>	<u>Total Attendance</u>
4 Aug 1968	Protestant Service	132
5 Aug 1968	Roman Catholic Mass	115
11 Aug 1968	Protestant Services	115
12 Aug 1968	Protestant Services	15
12 Aug 1968	Roman Catholic Mass	76
18 Aug 1968	Protestant Services	60
25 Aug 1968	Protestant Services	108

b. Counseling

The Battalion Chaplain held 23 individual counseling sessions, made weekly visits to the hospital facilities, and processes 18 American Red Cross Health and Welfare requests.

K. MEDICAL AND DENTAL AFFAIRS

1. Medical

During the period 1-18 Aug 1968 the BAS was aboard the USS TRIPOLI. In addition a forward BAS was established in the field on 1 Aug 1968 in order to take care of minor ailments encountered in the field and thereby ease the influx of Non Battle Casualty evacuations to the USS TRIPOLI. The mobile field BAS proved to be a success and thus remained with the BLT C.P. throughout the reporting period. On 18 Aug 1968 a BAS was established with the BLT Rear at AN HOA, when ARG shipping sailed for Subic Bay. On 28 Aug this BLT was moved from AN HOA to DIA LA PASS, where it remained for the reporting period.

ENCLOSURE (1)

During the period 1-18 Aug 1968, the BAS aboard the USS TRIPOLI handled 98 routine sickcall patients and received 58 medical evacuations from the field. From 18-31 Aug 1968, the BLT Rear BAS handled 141 routine sickcall patients and 7 combat casualties. From 1-31 Aug 1968, the field BAS processed 135 patients. Casualties not evacuated to the USS TRIPOLI were taken to either Station Hospital, NSA DANANG, or 1st Hospital Company, DANANG. During the reporting period no significant medical problems were encountered.

2. DENTAL

From 1-18 Aug 68 dental care was provided by USS TRIPOLI. From 18-31 Aug 68 dental care was provided by 1st Dental Company at DANANG.

3. SANITATION

Sanitation aboard the USS TRIPOLI was handled by the ship's Medical Department. Sanitation in the field was handled by the company corpsmen, field BAS and BLT Rear BAS. No unusual sanitation problems were encountered.

4. MEDCAP

No MEDCAP services were rendered during the month of August.

L. INTELLIGENCE

1. For the period Operation ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST, 1-24 Aug 1968, see TAB A.
2. During the period 25-31 Aug 1968 BLT 2/7 was committed in the DANANG Area due to intelligence reports of an impending enemy offensive. One company was committed to 3rd Amtrac Battalion's AOA to reinforce and act as a blocking force. Intelligence reports indicated that the V 25th, and 402nd Sapper Bn's were operating in this area.

On 28 Aug 1968 Company F and the Alpha Command Group were relocated at DIA LA PASS, their mission being to provide security in that area. On the night of 30 Aug 1968 two bunkers manned by Company F were attacked and hit by RPG rockets. Low level agent reports indicated that the attack was conducted by an unidentified NVA Reconnaissance platoon of approximately 40 men. This was the only indication of enemy activity in the DIA LA PASS and Hill 70 area.

ENCLOSURE (1)

M. COMMUNICATIONS

1. For the period Operation ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST, 1-24 Aug 1968, see TAB A.
2. For the period 25-31 Aug 1968, communications were generally good. Despite the wide dispersion of BLT units in the DaNang area no major problems were encountered in maintaining contact with these units. Due to interference, two frequency changes were necessary, one on the TACP local net and the other on the Company G Tactical net. Frequency changes remedied the problem in both cases.

While operating in the DAI LA PASS area it was necessary to remote both the Battalion Tactical Net and the 3/1 Tactical Net which the BLT was monitoring, due to hill masses on both sides of the BLT C.P.

N. WEATHER

Weather for the reporting period was characteristically hot, humid, and sunny. The weather had no adverse effects on operations except that intense heat and humidity occasionally slowed the speed of movement of the troops.

O. FIRE SUPPORT

1. For the period Operation ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST, 1-24 Aug 1968, see TAB A.
2. For the period 25-31 Aug 1968, fire support was adequate and responsive. 107mm Mortar Btry, 3/11 continued in direct support of BLT 2/7. Battery "H", 3rd Bn, 11th Marines was in general support reinforcing 3rd Bn, 11th Marines. 4th Bn, 11th Marine Regiment was prepared to provide reinforcing fires for the BLT if they were needed. Mortar Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines and the BLT 2/7 81mm Mortar Platoon supported BLT 2/7 with 6 registration, 15 observed, and 8 unobserved fire missions during this period. 30 HE, 20 WP, and 53 Ill rounds were expended for a total of 103 rounds fired. Battery "H", 3rd Bn 11th Marines support for 3rd Bn, 11th Marines consisted of five registration, 11 observed, and 97 unobserved fire missions. 506 HE, 12 WP, and 4 Ill rounds were expended for a total of 522 rounds fired. Because of the relatively quiet tactical situation encountered when the BLT moved into the DANANG area, the BLT's fire support requirements for this period were minimal.

ENCLOSURE (1)

P. AIR SUPPORT

1. For the period Operation ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST, 1-24 Aug 1968, see TAB A.
2. During the period 25-31 Aug 1968, no air support was required.

Q. TRAINING

1. BMT 2/7 provided RVN orientation indoctrination training for 13 Marine Officers and 182 enlisted Marine replacement personnel during the reporting period.

PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. TAB A Combat After Action Report (Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK/  
MAMELUKE THRUST). *f/w COMD CARD*

ENCLOSURE (1)



~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
Battalion Landing Team 2/7  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/LCS/mar  
3000  
25 Aug 1968  
Ser. No. 0039-68

2 Bn. 7th Marines

Log No. 00149-68

Copy No. 102 of 130

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander Task Group 79.5

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST)

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67  
(b) MAPS: AMS Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L7014 Sheets 6640 I, III, and IV, Sheets 6641 II, III

Encl:  (1) Operation Overlay for SWIFT PLAY

1. Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST

2. Dates and Location

a. Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST began on 23 Jul 1968 and was terminated on 24 Aug 1968.

(1) Operation SWIFT PLAY commenced 230900H Jul 68 and ended 241600H Jul 68. Operation SWIFT PLAY was executed under OPCON CTG 79.5 and took place in the vicinity of NUI DA THE and adjacent mountains.

(2) For BLT 2/7 Operation ALLEN BROOK commenced 241600H Jul 68 when BLT 2/7 passed under OPCON of Commanding Officer, 27th Marines. After further operations in the NUI DA THE area, BLT 2/7 swept in a northerly direction through the NUI DO and NUI UE DAP mountains. On 31 July 1968 BLT 2/7 moved on to GO NOI Island, where the remainder of the BLT's participation in Operation ALLEN BROOK took place. At 031200H Aug 68 OPCON of BLT 2/7 was passed to Commanding Officer, 5th Marines.

(3) For BLT 2/7 Operation MAMELUKE THRUST commenced 170600H Aug 68 and ended 210900H Aug 68. The operation was executed under OPCON 5th Marines and took place in the vicinity of CHAU PHONG and AN TAN, southeast of Liberty Bridge.

b. The mission assigned to BLT 2/7 during Operation SWIFT PLAY was to conduct an amphibious assault in the AOA to find, fix and destroy enemy

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TAB (A)

BLT 2/7

A/R Rpt Opns SWIFT PLAY, ALLEN BROOK, & MAMELUKE THRUST

Z3CULY-24MAY 1968

forces, and capture or destroy enemy fortifications in the area. In the GO NOI Islands (Operation ALLEN BROOK) BLT 2/7 was given the additional mission of providing security for engineer units conducting land clearing operations on the island. On Operation MAMELUKE THRUST BLT 2/7 (-) was assigned the mission of establishing a blocking position from vicinity AT918497 to AT938510 to assist 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 5th Marines capturing or destroying enemy forces, weapons, positions, and material in the CHAU PHONG (2) village complex. The exact boundaries of the operation were adjusted as the operation progressed. See enclosure (1).

### 3. Command Headquarters

- a. SWIFT PLAY 230900H - 241600H Jul 68 - SLF BRAVO (CTG 79.5) aboard USS TRIPOLI.
- b. ALLEN BROOK 241600H Jul - 031200H Aug 68 - 27th MARINES - 27th MARINES REGT Combat Base (AT989678).
- c. ALLEN BROOK 031200H - 241200H Aug 68 - FIFTH MARINES - FIFTH MARINES REGT Combat Base - AN HOA (AT875475).
- d. MAMELUKE THRUST 170600H - 210900H Aug - FIFTH MARINES - FIFTH MARINES REGT Combat Base - AN HOA (AT875475).

### 4. Task Organization

BLT 2/7

LtCol. C. E. MUELLER  
23-29 Jul 1968  
LtCol. L. E. WATSON  
30 Jul - 24 Aug 1968

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Capt. T. A. WILLIAMSON  
23 Jul - 11 Aug 1968  
Lt. J. H. HALSEY II  
12 Aug 1968  
Capt. R. R. WELPOTT  
13-24 Aug 1968

Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div  
Det, Hq Co, 7th Mar  
Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Det, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 7th Mar  
Det, Dental Co, 9th MAB  
2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
Det, LSU, For Leg Cmd  
C & C Plat, Co A, 5th Med Bn, 9th MAB  
Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

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Co E (Rein)

Co E  
 Det, H&S Co  
   FAC Tm  
   FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat  
   NGF Spot Tm  
 Det, Btry H, (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Co F (Rein)

Co F  
 Det, H&S Co  
   FAC Tm  
   FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat  
   NGF Spot Tm  
 Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Co G (Rein)

Co G  
 Det, H&S Co  
   FAC Tm  
   FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat  
 Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, 2nd Plat, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Co H (Rein)

Co H  
 Det, H&S Co  
   FO TM, 81mm Mortar Plat  
 Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, 2nd Plat, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. J. F. ABELE  
 23-28 Jul 1968  
 1stLt. S. R. MATULICH  
 29 Jul - 7 Aug 1968  
 Capt. J. T. FRICKER  
 8-24 Aug 1968

1stLt. G. W. HUMPHREY

Capt. R. R. O'NEILL  
 23-29 Jul 1968  
 1stLt. G. HEATLY  
 30 Jul - 12 Aug 1968  
 Capt. A. V. LATTORE  
 13-24 Aug 1968

Capt. T. P. E. HOLM

1stLt. J. R. GILL

UNCLASSIFIED

(4)

Mortar Btry (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

1stLt. M. S. MOSELEY

23 Jul 1968

Capt. G. D. BERGER

24 Jul - 5 Aug 1968

1stLt. C. B. THOMAS JR.

6-24 Aug 1968

81mm Mortar Plat

2ndLt. D. J. MCMAHON

2nd Plat, Co B, 1st Tank Bn

1stLt. M. E. HASTINGS

3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Amtrac Bn

2ndLt. M. E. NELSON

1st Plat, Co E, 1st Recon Bn

1stLt. W. H. MCKIOSKEY

2nd Plat, Co A, 11th MT Bn

1stLt. E. T. CHARBONNEAU

5. Intelligence

- a. Enemy Strength Prior to Operation. Prior to commencing Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK on 23 July 1968, the most recent intelligence indicated that one U/I NVA Regiment (possibly the 141st) was located in Base Area 116. According to various captured documents the enemy intended to attack DUY XUYEN, DIEN BAN, HOI AN and forward Marine installations in the southern sector of the DaNang Tactical Area of Responsibility. This attack was to take place between 20 July 1968 and mid August employing the 38th Regiment, 68th Artillery Regiment (-), D-//D-3 Bn, and U/I Bn. Indications were that the enemy would escalate his usual attacks by fire. Contacts with enemy units were likewise expected to increase in frequency and intensity through August and September.

Prior to taking part in Operation MAMELUKE THRUST on 17 Aug 1968, the most recent intelligence reports collected from agent reports and verified by aerial photography indicated that at least two enemy battalions were located in the vicinity of CHAU PHONG (2) (vicinity AT9349). One of the Battalions was identified as a sapper battalion, but of unknown designation. The other Battalion was identified as the R-20 Bn. Other indicators affirmed that a higher control headquarters was also located with the two Battalions. It was believed that the enemy units had just moved into the area and were using CHAU PHONG (2) as an assembly point/base area for future attacks to the North and East (i.e. DaNang and Hoi An).

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- b. Enemy Strength, Mission, and Tactics During the Operation. Contrary to intelligence reports during Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK BLT 2/7 had little contact with enemy units in the amphibious operations area and found no significant signs of an NVA Regiment in Base Area 116. Enemy units encountered were squad size or smaller and limited their activities to either delaying type actions or evasion of friendly forces. The enemy made extensive use of booby traps and mines in an attempt to both delay and inflict casualties on the BLT. Because of the enemy's evasive action and the resultant light contacts, no determination could be made as to the identification and composition of the enemy nor were there any indications that he would launch other than harassment type activities against friendly positions in the amphibious operations area.

Contacts during Operation MAMELUKE THRUST verified the intelligence reports upon which the CHAU PHONG Operation was based. A cordon and sweep of CHAU PHONG (2) area resulted in catching an estimated two enemy battalions in the objective area. One of these battalions was verified, by a detainee, as the R-20 Bn. Once the enemy realized he was encircled he attempted to make a hasty egress from the objective area. In so doing, he was forced to leave behind many of his heavier crew served weapons and caches of ammunition, equipment, documents and food stuffs. Discovery of unburied bodies and weapons by the sweep force further verified that the enemy had been caught by surprise. This was verified on the second day by interrogation of detainees. With the sweeping force moving north through CHAU PHONG (2), the major portion of the enemy fled to the east and northeast, attempting to break BLT 2/7's blocking position from AT967490 to AT955510. On 17 Aug 1968 Companies F and G engaged two enemy companies. On the following day Company E engaged another company size enemy force. During both of these engagements the enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rockets. The enemy appeared well equiped wearing helmets, body armor, upper torso, green utilities. He was armed primarily with B-40 rockets and AK-47's. The enemy encountered were fresh. His determined fight to breakthrough the blocking force gave further evidence of his morale, training, and discipline.

- c. Terrain. Initially the terrain encountered in the SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK amphibious operations area consisted of steep, rugged hills with light secondary, scrub growth. Water was non-existent in the higher hills. Movement was generally unimpeded except by the steep incline of the hills.

The major portion of Operations ALLEN BROOK and MAMELUKE THRUST were conducted in generally flat, sparsely vegetated terrain interlaced with dikes, rice paddies, rivers and streams, characteristic of GO NOI Island and the surrounding country side. Despite the extensive waterways, most of the area was suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicle use.

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- d. Weather. The weather had no adverse effect on the operation with the exception of the intense heat and humidity which occasionally slowed the speed of movement of the troops.

6. Mission

BLT 2/7's mission during Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK was to conduct an amphibious assault in the amphibious operations area to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, and capture or destroy enemy fortifications in the area.

On 31 July 1968 the mission of the BLT was expanded when it relieved 3rd Battalion, 27th Marines in the vicinity of PHU LANH, QUANG NAM PROVINCE (on GO NOI Island). At this time the BLT became the security for a detachment of engineers employing bulldozers and other heavy equipment in a land clearing operation on GO NOI Island. The previous mission of combat sweep operations continued to be carried out in the new area by two companies reinforced, the remaining companies and attachments in support, providing physical security for the land clearance operation. The purpose of this land clearance operation was to deny the use of GO NOI Island as a staging area for large enemy units.

On Operation MAMELUKE THRUST, 17-21 Aug 1968, BLT 2/7 (-)'s mission was to establish a blocking position from AT918497 to AT938510 in an effort to locate and capture or destroy enemy forces, weapons, positions, and material in the CHAU PHONG (2) village complex.

7. Execution

a. Concept

On D-Day (23 July 68) BLT 2/7 landed at H-Hour (0900H) in a helicopter borne assault at LZ's SHEPARD and CHAPMAN. Co F, Co G, the Alfa Command Group, 81mm Mortar Platoon, and Mortar Btry, 3/11, landed in LZ SHEPARD, where a fire base was established with Co F providing security. Co E and Co H landed in LZ CHAPMAN. Combat sweep operations were conducted in Search Areas I, II, and III. The BLT generally followed an axis of advance that lead southwest, west, and then wheeled north towards GO NOI Island. Company Base camps were progressively established along the axis of advance from which deep lateral patrols were conducted to seek enemy forces, base camps and arms and food caches.

On 31 July 1968 BLT 2/7 moved on to GO NOI Island, relieved 3rd Battalion, 27th Marines, and established a combat base in the vicinity of PHU LANH (BTO30533). From this combat base BLT 2/7 provided security for the land clearing operations in the PHU LANH Area and conducted combat sweep operations, patrols, and ambushes. Subsequent BLT combat bases were established in the vicinity of CAM LAU TRUNG (1) (BTO35550) and XUAN DAI (2) (BTO02545), where the same mission was carried out.

Operation MAMELUKE THRUST. At 162300H Aug 1968 BLT 2/7 (-), consisting of Co F, G, H, and the Alfa Command Group, conducted a covert night foot march to establish blocking positions along the stream from AT967490 to AT955510 at H minus 60 minutes. At 170600H BLT 2/7 (-) was in position and prepared to attack or shift position on order. Prep fires were conducted on the objective area, CHAU PHONG (2), on the following schedule: H-90 minutes to H-45 minutes artillery prep, H-45 minutes to H-15 minutes air prep, H-15 minutes to H-Hour air prep with CS gas. To the northwest 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (-) established a blocking position from AT918497 to AT938510. From the south at H-Hour (0700H) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-) swept north towards the objective, CHAU PHONG (2).

b. Significant Events. The following is a summary of significant events and contacts with the enemy.

- (1) 261330H Jul 68-While executing a sweep, Co G found what appeared to be a VC indoctrination center with a large mess hall and classroom at AT989447. Center could easily hold 60-75 persons.
- (2) 171200H-171700H Aug 68-While in blocking positions Co F and Co G observed approximately 200 enemy at vicinity of AT948502 wearing helmets, body armor, green utilities and carrying B-40 rockets and AK-47's. Contact was made with the enemy unit and an artillery fire mission was called as well as air strike. This contact resulted in 53 NVA KIA and 11 USMC WIAE.
- (3) 180700H-181630H Aug 68-While attacking north in vicinity of coordinates AT950505, AT955505, and AT954508, Co E received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from a company size enemy force near AT952506. Co E returned fire and called an artillery mission and air strikes. Results of this contact were 6 USMC KIA, 25 USMC WIAE, 12 NVA were killed and one carbine, two SKS's, a gas mask, and assorted 782 gear and documents captured. No other significant contacts were made with the enemy by BLT 2/7 during this operation in and around CHAU PHONG (2).
- (4) On 210900H Aug BLT 2/7 (-) withdrew from Operation MAMELUKE THRUST and returned to full BLT participation in Operation ALLEN BROOK on GO NOI Island. At 230830H Aug 1968 the BLT received word to move to DANANG to supplement the defensive perimeter of the DANANG Air Base. Companies F, G, and H were moved to an LZ at AT967535 for helilift that began at 231435H. Company F was lifted to 3rd Amtrac Bn and Company G and H and Alfa Command Group were lifted to 1st Tank Bn area. On 24 Aug 1968 Company E and the remaining elements of H&S Company completed the move to Liberty Bridge with the engineering equipment and then joined the other elements of the BLT at 1st Tank Bn area on 25 Aug 1968.

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- (5) At 200130H Aug 1968, while at 100% alert, the BLT Rear, at AN HOA, recieved fire from the barbed wire to its front. This barrier was about 100 meters forward of the most advanced position of the BLT Rear defense network and separated the village of PHU DA (2) (ATB70478) from AN HOA Combat Base. Fire was returned from the BLT positions. On the following day 13th ITT personnel confirmed that 10 enemy had been killed by BLT 2/7 Rear personnel on the previous night.

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- (6) A convoy of 215 men and heavy equipment under the command of the BLT Executive Officer departed vicinity BT002542 at (GO NOI Island) 240650H Aug 1968. At vicinity AT990530 an LVTE-1 struck a box mine of sufficient charge to break the left track, destroy six road wheels and split the hull of the vehicle. There were four WIAE as a result of this incident. Permission was obtained from CG 1st Mar Div to strip and destroy the vehicle. When this was accomplished and the MEDEVAC Helicopter, which had had mechanical failure upon landing, had been lifted out of the LZ, the convoy proceeded on, cutting a new road with bulldozers in an effort to bypass other suspected mined areas and ambush sites. The column was subjected to sporadic sniper fire throughout its move to Liberty Bridge (AT925535) and was required to request air support at PHU DONG (2) (AT967543) in order to force its way past enemy concentrations. At AT945541 due to a heavy tree line the convoy was forced to return to the existant road. In traveling the last 700 meters to Liberty Bridge, and at and after dusk, engineers detected and destroyed nine mines ranging from a 155mm round to 20 lb box mines.

### C. Supporting Arms

- (1) General. The quality and quantity of fire support available during this period was excellent. In addition to BLT 2/7's organic 81mm Mortar Platoon and two attached artillery batteries, fire support was also available from 2nd Bn, 13th Marines, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines and aircraft.
- (2) Artillery. Artillery support consisted of 180 observed fire missions, 1,573 unobserved missions, and 182 registration missions. A total of 11,732 HE, 799 WP and 550 III rounds were expended for a total of 13,081 rounds fired. H&I fires were delivered on areas of known enemy activity and in response to intelligence information passed from higher echelons. Firing units were cooperative and highly responsive.
- (3) Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire was not employed during Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST because the amphibious operations area was out of range of Naval Gunfire ships.
- (4) Air Support
- (a) CAS. During the period 23-31 July 1968 20 Close Air Support missions were flown in support of BLT 2/7. From 1-24 Aug 1968, excluding the period 16-22 Aug, BLT 2/7 received 27 flights of fixed wing in direct support. 14 flights of A-4Es, eleven

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flights of F-4Bs, and two flights of air force aircraft were controlled. 708 500 lb bombs, 133 500 lb napalm bombs, 378 Zuni rockets, and approximately 8,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition were expended in support of the BLT. During the period that the Battalion participated in Operation MAMELUKE THRUST, 16-22 Aug 1968, it was supported by 24 flights of fixed wing aircraft consisting of 16 flights of F-4Bs and eight flights of A-4Es. 144 500 lb bombs, 144 500 lb napalm bombs, over 480 Zuni rockets, and over 4,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition were delivered by these aircraft. These aircraft accounted for at least 37 NVA killed.

- (b) TPQ-10's. No TPQ-10's were utilized due to proximity of targets to friendly forces.
- (c) Flareships. Flareship support was provided in two instances by VMGR-152 aircraft on station. These aircraft provided excellent illumination which enabled ground units in one case to be safely extracted from a landing zone on the night of 23 August.
- (d) AOs. BLT 2/7 had the services of AOs in O-1G, OV-10 and UH-1E aircraft. Although their primary function was observation, many artillery and Close Air Support missions were coordinated by these aircraft.
- (e) Medevacs. During the reporting period HMMs 164, 165, and 265 provided helicopters for medevacs. For the period, 23 July 17 Aug 1968 BLT 2/7 primarily utilized helicopters provided by CTG 79.5 (HMM 265) from aboard the USS TRIPOLI. On two particular occasions the BLT was forced to rely solely on in-country sources for helicopter support. These two occasions were from 272125H-291700H July 1968 and from 300700H-310830H July 1968 when HMM 265 was forced to ground all its aircraft because of fuel problems. From 18-24 Aug 1968 the BLT was again forced to rely solely on in-country sources for helicopter support as a result of the movement of ARG shipping to Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines. Overall response to medical evacuation requests was good. During participation in Operation MAMELUKE THRUST, 16-22 Aug 1968, helicopter support was exceptional.

d. Logistics

- (1) For Operations SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK/MAMELUKE THRUST, the TAC-LOG was established aboard the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10).
- (2) The LSA was established aboard the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) on D-Day 23 July 1968, and then was moved ashore to 27th Marines C.P. on

25 July 1968. From 25 July - 8 Aug 1968 the LSA was located at 27th Marine's C. P. On 9 Aug 1968 the LSA was moved to 5th Marine's C.P. at AN HOA, where it remained until the end of the operation on 24 Aug 1968. The only significant problem encountered by the LSA occurred during the period 3-9 Aug 1968 when the LSA was located at the 27th Marine's C.P. after the BLT had passed to the OPCON of 5th Marine's. The problem was principally of communications and could have been avoided had the LSA had been moved to the 5th Marine's C.P. at AN HOA at the same time that the BLT OPCON was chopped to 5th Marine's, on 3 Aug 1968. Throughout the operations supplies were requested through Helicopter Support Teams, which were attached to each of the major units in the field, and filled by the LSA. Total resupply weight for period 23 July - 24 Aug 1968 was 757,983 pounds.

- (3) HMM 164, 165, and 265 provided helicopters for resupply during the operations.
- (4) The LSA was the primary source of all classes of resupplies and no problems were encountered in furnishing the needed supplies with the occasional exception of class II supplies. When the LSA was moved from 27th Marine's C.P. to 5th Marine's C.P. on 9 Aug 1968, there was a limited amount of class II resupplies available due to the remote location of AN HOA as a Stockage Issue Point. AN HOA Class II supplies had to be brought from Force Logistics Command to the LSA by a convoy which usually arrived every two days. On 17 Aug 1968 H&S Co Supply Section came ashore and established the LSA at AN HOA. Approximately a 15 day stock of Class II, Type I items were brought in. This somewhat alleviated the Class II supply problem.
- (5) Items requiring 2nd, 3rd, and 4th echelon maintenance were repaired by Contact Teams from the BLT's Logistic Support Unit. Items requiring detailed 4th echelon and 5th echelon maintenance were sent to FSR for repair. From 18-24 Aug 1968 some equipment repair and maintenance in the field was hindered due to the shortage of LSU Contact Teams. This was a result of a significant portion of the BLT's Logistic Support Unit having sailed for Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, with ARG shipping, to provide for a modified rehabilitation program for the BLT equipment still embarked aboard that shipping.
- (6) Transportation for the LSA operation at 27th Marine's C.P. and 5th Marine's C.P. was provided by the BLT Truck Platoon. While at 27th Marine's C.P. water was hauled from a water point near DaNang, RVN; while at 5th Marine's C.P. water was hauled from a water point at AN HOA.

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E. Communications. During the operation, Communications were generally good. At times the lower frequencies used were affected by fading and/or interference. When this occurred higher unused frequencies had to be selected from the current COI in order to maintain effective communications within the BLT. On several occasions Vietnamese broadcast stations caused broad-band interference in the 35-45 mc region. These interference problems could probably have been avoided by a more discerning distribution of frequencies to the BLT prior to its entering the amphibious operations area.

The RC-292 antenna was used extensively throughout the operation, especially at the BLT C.P., and was a leg to successful communications throughout the AOA. During the move of the final Convoy from GO NOI Island on 24-25 August a field expedient was used in conjunction with the RC 292. As communications with 5th Marine's (at AN HOA) using the whip antenna had proved unsatisfactory from GO NOI Island, the BLT Radio Chief mounted an RC 292 antenna on a pole approximately seven feet high and lashed the assembly to the vehicle antenna mount. Communications with 5th Marine's were superb throughout the convoy's move. Operating units generally relied on the whip antenna throughout the operations.

Cipher transmissions were accomplished using a PRC-77, KY-38 combination on temporary loan to the BLT from 5th Marine's. Communications with these two small, portable units was excellent. Both units would make a valuable asset to the communications T/E of the BLT. Back-up cipher capability was provided by one MRC-109, KY-8 combination.

Because of the length of the operation, and dispersion of units, some difficulty was experienced in conducting preventive maintenance and technical inspection for the PRC-25 radios. This resulted in reduced field life and use of some PRC-25 radios. Our effort to eliminate this problem was to "float" radios, i. e., make a one for one exchange with units in the field, this effort met with limited success as it was tied to the availability of transportation to units in contact, and a small number of radios with which to make an exchange.

## 8. Results

### A. Friendly

#### (1) USMC Casualties

##### (a) Enlisted

KIA	:	21
WIA	:	116
WIANE	:	21
NBCE	:	159

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## (b) Officer

KIA	:	2
WIA	:	8
WIANE	:	3
NBCE	:	3

## (2) USN Casualties

## (a) Enlisted

KIA	:	0
WIA	:	5
WIANE	:	1
NBCE	:	6

(b) Officer : None

## (3) Equipment Damage

(a) 1 LVTE

Damaged by land mine and destroyed by BLT due to mechanical inability to move it or provide adequate security in a prevailing hostile environment.

(b) 2 Mechanical Mules

One Mule with transmission and rear end damage and another Mule with broken steering column.

## B. Enemy

## (1) Personnel

(a)	NVA KIA	:	81
(b)	VC KIA	:	39
(c)	Detainees	:	32
(d)	Chieu Hoi	:	0

## (2) Weapons Captured

(a)	(1)	M-1 Rifle
(b)	(1)	AK-47
(c)	(7)	SKS's
(d)	(1)	M-1 Carbine
(e)	(1)	M-2 Carbine

- (3) Grenades and Mines Captured/Destroyed
- (a) (1) 150 lb Box Mine
  - (b) (3) 40 lb Box Mines
  - (c) (3) 3 lb Box Mines
  - (d) (1) Chi Com Grenades
  - (e) (6) Satchel Charges
- (4) Ammunition Captured (by rounds)
- (a) 1200 SKS rounds
  - (b) (3) 122 Rocket Motors
  - (c) (1) 122 Rocket Head
  - (d) (1) Box of 100 rounds of 50 cal ammunition
  - (e) (6) 82mm Mortar fuse assemblies
- (5) Miscellaneous Equipment Captured
- (a) (1) Chi Com Radio
  - (b) (30) gal of Salted Fish
  - (c) 6,800 lbs of rice
  - (d) 625 lbs of potatoes
  - (e) 100 lbs of peanuts
  - (f) 100 lbs of corn
  - (g) Miscellaneous medical gear
  - (h) Miscellaneous 782 gear

#### 9. Commander's Analysis

The combat sweep in Base Area 116, which began Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK, and subsequent sweeps were largely unproductive in terms of enemy killed and war materials destroyed. Nonetheless, this was a valid employment of the BLT. Company sized sweeps forced the movement of enemy units in the area, as evidenced by rice caches and small camps uncovered as well as rear action sniping directed at BLT units.

The subsequent employment of the BLT on GO NOI Island, as the security force for an engineer detachment conducting land clearing operations, was not in keeping with existing doctrines of employing the SLF. The general tactic used was to maintain a perimeter around the area to be cleared, using two rifle companies, supporting units from H&S Company and the 107mm Mortar Battery providing general support from firing positions within the perimeter. The remaining two rifle companies conducted sweep operations during the day, set ambushes and conducted extensive patrolling at night, outside of the BLT defensive perimeter. This tactic proved successful as no enemy units of significant size were able to mass and harass or disrupt the land clearance activities.

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Participation in Operation MAMELUKE THRUST provided the BLT its first opportunity, during the month of August, to come face to face, in armed combat, with a large enemy unit. At 162300H Aug 1968 Companies E, F and G with the Alpha Command Group commenced a night march from vic AT001543 on GO NOI Island to a blocking position east of the CAY KHE River at coordinates AT958500. Contact with a large enemy force on the morning of 17 Aug 1968 proved the intelligence information upon which this operation was initiated, to be correct in detail. The three battalion attack in the objective area proved highly successful both in terms of enemy killed and food and arms caches discovered. Results of this action proved the value of a swift reaction to reliable intelligence information and that an undetected, multi-Battalion night movement is possible on very short notice.

In summary, no new lessons were learned nor were any new tactics developed as a result of the BLT's participation in Operation SWIFT PLAY/ALLEN BROOK and MAMELUKE THRUST.

*L. E. Watson*  
L. E. WATSON

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LEGEND

VIET 1:50,000

SERIAL - L 7014

SHEET - 6640I, 6640IV


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SA - SEARCH AREA

SECRET




OPERATION OVERLAY

"Swift Play"







LEDGENT

-  TRENCHLINE
-  BUNKERS
-  CAVES

ALL BUNKERS WERE APPROXIMATELY  
 SAME SIZE 4° LONG  
 4° DEEP  
 2°-3° WIDE  
 NOT TO SCALE



N  
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 S



ENCLOSURE 2

(A)