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A NEW BEGINNING OR THE END OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS? J.D. Lynch, Jr. Michael “Lancer” Sullivan Major General USMC (Ret) Major General USMC (Ret) [COURTESY: Col Douglas Rapé, USMC (Ret)]
Introduction
Commandant of the Marine Corps
General David Berger’s “Force Design 2030” has caused quite a stir. The
document envisages a shifting of the Marine Corps from a “Second Land
Army” force to a “commando – like infantry force with nimbler weapons:
drone squadrons will double and rocket batteries will triple.” (1) There
is more, much more, to it than those changes. Force Design 2030 has its
supporters, among whom is Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper (2) and there
is certainly support in the active duty Marine Corps, an organization
noted for its historic loyalty to the Commandant. There are, however,
skeptics within active duty ranks and the large population of former
Marines, retired and otherwise. The concern centers on the future, if
any, of the “commando – like infantry force.” All things considered, it
is a subject definitely worth discussion. Today’s General Situation Today’s situation resembles the world of the late 1930’s. Then, Hitler was using military threats and power to acquire territory, including countries. Today, we face an equally aggressive and far more sophisticated Communist China using economic power to acquire control of, among other things, world supply chains, manufacturing, businesses, distant sea ports and merchant shipping lanes. And if those are not enough, we have been too placid about the obvious copying of American military and naval equipment, including aircraft and ships. Communist China had been running amok until her progress was slowed during the past few years by the “America First” imposition of tariffs and other measures to stop economic outrages such as theft of American intellectual property. Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, there were signs that America’s actions were having an effect. Predictions that China’s economy was headed for trouble had become commonplace. China’s pandemic behavior has caused itself even more problems. For example, The Voice of Europe publication recently noted that Britain, the European Union, the USA and Japan are taking measures to break the stranglehold Communist China has on the world’s supply chains by bringing home businesses from China, “… unelected Communist Party bigwigs are said to be in a state of panic.”(3) Meanwhile, America has spent years helping the Communist Chinese become a dominant world economic power. During that process and others, the American national debt became both astronomical and growing. It is now somewhere north of 25 TRILLION dollars and destined to grow to even greater levels as the government spends trillions fighting the economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic shutdown and the need to help finance the return of companies to the United States. Adding more gloom to that financial situation is the fact that there are those in Washington eager to spend trillions more on such socialist dreams as the Green New Deal, government controlled health care, free college tuition for all, reparations for slavery, and of course, the ever present “need” to bail out states that have been mismanaging funds, budgets, and retirement benefits for state employees for years. Not satisfied with those fiscal adventures, Washington is also considering a three trillion dollar second round of post coronavirus financial programs. In brief, the two major powers competing for world economic leadership are now each facing a harsh economic situation. Force Design 2030 Operational Background FD 2030 is based upon the results of a series of “analytically based” wargames conducted over the past 3 or 4 years. (4) The fundamental result of the wargames is that the future Marine Corps structure is to be aimed at war with China. The ground combat organization will feature “Marine Littoral Regiments.” The Littoral Regiments will, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, operate in “… dispersed, smaller units of 50 to 100 with a less prominent footprint, armed with long range missiles, rocket artillery and drones.”(5) Other news organizations indicate that the operations envisaged will be conducted on island chains in the South China and East China seas. (6) The impression given is that small units will be infiltrated ashore and hidden among the population. Conventional shipping containers carrying long range anti-ship missiles are to be smuggled ashore from commercial shipping and transported to hidden staging areas by rented trucks. These hidden advanced bases will then use the long range missiles to help the Navy gain control of the seas around the island chains and prevent further Chinese sea power expansion. The result of the wargames and development of the concept summarized above is the reorganization of the entire Fleet Marine Force (the Marine Corps’ combat forces) into Force Design 2030. The three active duty Marine Expeditionary Forces are to be organized, trained and equipped based upon the results of wargames examining one contingency in one place against one foe ... the Chinese Navy in the South and East China Seas. This is a revolutionary approach to force structure planning and as wisely noted by former Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb, “There is no greater danger in military strategy than shaping a nation’s force structure to respond to one specific set of contingencies, giving an adversary the ability to adjust and adapt beforehand.” (7) No military planner should doubt that the Chinese have been reading all about Force Design 2030. Control of the East and South China Seas The current Chinese sea control situation does not favor the United States. For example, “The U.S. Navy now faces a serious mismatch in Asia. One watched it happen as China cranked out four warships for every American one made over the last decade – and China keeps building more. Meanwhile, U.S. ship numbers have barely budged and the American ship building effort has been unimpressive, to put the situation charitably.” (8) Making the disparity worse are estimates that, in the region, there are now from 5 to 10 Chinese warships for each USN warship. (9) America’s bottom line sea control problem in the China Seas is lack of warships and money, not land based anti-ship missiles. The money and warship problems can only be solved if the nation finds and implements a solution to its oncoming calamity, the national debt. That is an imperative. It can only be done by Washington, a city awash in political divisiveness. The environment is so acid that we are starting to hear or read reports that the resistance of some states to reopening from the coronavirus shutdown is often based on the political goal of destroying the economy. The ultimate goal? Political success in 2020. Without a change of political attitudes, there is little chance of a major shipbuilding program, even if the nation has enough shipyards, which unfortunately, may be yet another problem. On the bright side, in addition to other methods of curtailing Communist China’s economic power and her ambitions, China is now forced to deal with the movement of Japanese and Western industries back to their home countries. Her ultimate success or failure will depend largely on the moral strength and willpower of the U.S. and the other countries involved. If she fails in whatever actions she undertakes, Communist China will no longer be the threat to world security, including sea power, she has become. There would be no reason for Force Design 2030. Conversely, if America does not resolve its Washington political and debt problems while simultaneously undertaking an emergency warship construction program similar to FDR’s late 1930’s effort, there is again no reason to implement Force Design 2030. China’s control of the China Sea around the island chains would only have become stronger. Their growing Navy and the new and growing Chinese Marine Corps would have a field day destroying small detachments of Marines on China Sea islands. The Dangerous Loss – Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF’s) When giving guidance to planners working the Force Design 2030 project, the commandant stated or wrote, “…the Marine Corps is the nation’s crisis response force by law, by role, and by function. So whatever we build for structure, the design for the future structure of the Marine Corps it must be capable of responding to any crisis, anywhere in the world, without any notice.”(10) That piece of commandant’s guidance addresses the requirement to respond to the most likely form of combat commitment the Fleet Marine Force will encounter…warfighting situations having nothing to do with the Chinese islands scenario. The emerging Force Design 2030 force structure, based upon one specific scenario in one specific place, does not meet the commandant’s 911 Force guidance. Force Design 2030 requires a military force organized, trained and equipped to perform stealthy operations while maintaining a defensive attitude and posture until ordered to launch ship destroying missiles against an enemy ship or ships. The Force Design 2030 mindset, organization, training, and equipment will be far different from that found in MAGTF warfighting machines. The MAGTF combat history began in the Korean War where it proved to be an unbridled success. It was formalized in writing during in the late 1950’s or early 1960’s and since those days has seen several successful combat deployments. Today’s MAGTF’s fulfill the commandant’s guidance. It has been the nation’s “911 Force” for decades. What cannot be done in short order is convert an organization trained and equipped to conduct stealthy, defense oriented, small unit island missions into an offensive warfighting machine committed to warfighting anywhere in the world. I believe that it was the highly respected Marine General, Robert H. Barrow, who told us that,”… there will always be a Marine Corps, so long as we are ‘useful’ to the nation.” Force Design 2030 is no MAGTF and without the MAGTF, the Marine Corps would no longer be useful to the nation. In addition to being “ the force in readiness,” the Marine Corps is also the nation’s force organized, trained and equipped to project sea power ashore. Unfortunately, the nation’s amphibious warfare capabilities have been atrophying for years. The ability to conduct forcible entry operations from the sea, a capability that a maritime nation should have if its maritime interests are to be protected, is now limited. Force Design 2030 does nothing to improve the current situation. In fact, as shown below, Force Design 2030 actually weakens the MAGTF’s. Today’s Navy-Marine Corps point of main effort should be development of a more modern amphibious assault capability, including doctrine, anti-missile capabilities, better ship-to-shore equipment and smaller less expensive amphibious assault shipping. Other Losses Stemming From Force Design 2030 The Ground Combat Element The “new” Fleet Marine Force would lose an infantry regimental headquarters plus three infantry battalions. Further, each of the remaining infantry battalions will lose 200 Marines. The rationale for the loss of what amounts to an infantry regiment plus a total loss of an additional 4200 Marines (200 Marines are to be lost to each of the remaining infantry battalions), has not been identified. Infantry routinely suffers the most combat casualties. So much so that infantry losses and replacement shortages have often been a major source of nations’ strategic concerns. There is no point in reducing MAGTF infantry strengths without powerful evidence that the loss of infantry to the task organization actually benefits the MAGTF. The FMF will have only 5 cannon artillery batteries. Long range missiles are not an economic or tactical answer to a landing force. The artillery rockets mentioned in reading material are not described. Expensive? An area weapon? If they perform the same mission as cannon artillery, then why have any cannon artillery? On the other hand, if cannon artillery is of value, then why would we not have cannon artillery in each of the possible MAGTF’s? The elimination of tanks from the Table of Equipment requires that MAGTF’s without tanks engage enemies that are well equipped with tanks. It is said that, if necessary, the Army can loan us tanks. That statement is tacit acknowledgement of the fact that the MAGTF’s will probably need tanks. Will the Army program for tanks on loan? Why would the Army provide tank crews to work with an organization having no tank experience or training? Tanks should not be removed from the FMF. Force Design 2030 eliminates two amphibious assault companies. A Navy-Marine Corps effort to modernize amphibious warfare doctrine and equipment should result in a determination of amphibious assault vehicle requirements. Bridging capabilities are to be eliminated from the FMF. The Force Design 2030 concept is designed to operate in littoral areas. So too, are amphibious assault operations. Littoral areas tend to feature streams large and small, rivers, and marshy coastal areas. The decision to remove bridging capabilities from the combat service support arena should be revisited. The Air Combat Element The ACE provides the six functions of Marine aviation to the MAGTF which are; air assault, anti-air warfare, offensive air support, electronic warfare, control of aircraft and missiles, and reconnaissance. The air combat element means two major things to the MAGTF’s ground combat forces. It is the close air support hammer and the key to ground combat force tactical mobility. Thus far, Force Design 2030 operational descriptions do not include Marine Aviation in any definitive role. The Force Design 2030 document of March 2020 does state that there will be, “… some carefully constrained tests of the ability of the F-35B to operate and be sustained from austere, undeveloped landing sites.” Whether or not detachments of F-35B’s can be stationed in “austere, undeveloped landing sites” along with stealth – driven missile crews and missiles hiding in commercial shipping containers should not be a difficult question to answer considering the maintenance and supply requirements that accompany modern aircraft. The question then becomes one of just what is the role of Marine Aviation in Force Design 2030? The answer at this point seems to be none or very little. As will be shown, Marine Aviation will suffer the loss of 26% of its aircraft if Force Design 2030 is adopted. Quite a price to pay if and almost surely when there is a commitment to a non-Force Design 2020 mission. Major General Michael “Lancer” Sullivan, a retired Marine fighter/attack pilot, will describe the impact of Force Design 2020 on Marine aviation. Background; The Marine aviation structure changes made during the Commandant’s guidance for Force Design 2030 will have lasting effects and challenges on the capabilities of Marine aviation to support the ACE and the MAGTF with the needed combat power. Each change to the current aviation structure listed in Force Design 2030 will be discussed. F-35B/C Squadrons Currently the planned 18 active duty F-35B squadrons will have 16 aircraft assigned. Force Design 2030 reduces the number of F-35B’s in each squadron to 10 aircraft. The four F-35C squadrons the Marines will have will be 10 aircraft squadrons as that’s what the Navy has for optimum operational considerations aboard an aircraft carrier. Marine F-35C squadrons will augment the Navy’s Carrier Air Groups periodically. The problem with 10 aircraft F-35B squadrons is that if the squadron is tasked to support one of the Corps six MEUs with a six plane detachment, that leaves only four aircraft at home where little training can be accomplished as the basic fighting element for Marine F-35B’s is four aircraft. Aircraft availability would require all four aircraft be in an “up” status which will not materialize under normal conditions. With 16 aircraft squadrons they can deploy a six plane F-35B detachment with the MEU and still have 10 F-35Bs at home to train two, four plane elements and be able to deploy on a moment’s notice for a crisis, if required. If the costs of more F-35Bs is a factor then the number of squadrons must be reduced as reducing the number of aircraft in a F-35B squadron greatly reduces its capability to provide the needed support to the MAGTF. Another problem mentioned is the paucity of trained F-35B pilots, this is primarily because the Naval Air Training Command is not producing enough new pilots lately due to aircraft availability problems. Another fact is that many second tour F-35B pilots are getting out of the Corps and taking jobs with the airlines. This problem should subside with the advent of COVID-19. If the Marine Corps has trouble recruiting enough college students to fill future pilot requirements then they should resurrect the MarCad program as they’ll have plenty of volunteers. In the past many MarCads and NavCads went on to complete long and successful careers in the Corps. MV-22 Squadrons Force Design 2030 reduces the number of active duty MV-22 squadrons from 16 to 13 squadrons, evidently due to the divesting of three Infantry Battalions. However, if the MV-22 ever becomes capable of conducting air refueling with a “slide in, slide out” package that was recommended by the Warfighting Center in the late ‘80s, the requirement will be for at least 24 more MV-22’s to man the 11 LHD/LHA decks so that the F-35B’s and CH-53’s can use this needed service. These aircraft should be dedicated to the tanker role as it would be too large a maintenance effort to keep changing the refueling kits in and out of different MV-22’s. The F-35B has a little over 6,000 pounds less internal fuel than the F-35C due to the fan lift engine that gives it the STOVL capability. The F-35B definitely needs the MV-22 refueling capability aboard ship as Marine KC-130 tankers and USAF tankers will not be available in many places LHDs/LHAs will be positioned due to the enemy’s capability to shoot them down. Another option to increase the range and time on station for the F-35B is to develop external wing tanks so it can act as a buddy tanker to refuel other F-35Bs as this capability is critically needed if the MV-22 can’t be modified to serve as an aerial refueler for F-35B’s. CH-53K Squadrons... Force Design 2030 reduces the active duty CH-53K squadrons from eight to five. The addition of the CH-53K will give a huge increase in heavy lift capability for the MAGTF but it’s still a CH-53 and over the years it’s been very hard to maintain and readiness rates have been low. Divesting this number of Ch-53K’s could cause severe short falls in the MAGTF’s heavy lift capability. HMLA Squadrons Force Design 2030 reduces the active duty HMLA squadrons from seven to five. We need a sufficient amount of AH-1Z’s and UH-1Y’s to conduct offensive and defensive combat actions. Particularly important is the role they play in CAS during amphibious assaults and operations in an urban environment. We need to ensure that we have more rather than less because it’s so critical for CAS. VMGR Squadrons... Force Design 2030 adds one KC-130 squadron. This is badly needed even today as our TacAir assets in WestPac never have enough tankers to keep their combat readiness up. The few targets and ranges available are at great distances from MCAS Iwakuni where Marine TacAir is located. This will help keeping the readiness acceptable for those deployed (UDP) and permanently based squadrons. VMU Squadrons Force Design 2030 adds three VMU squadrons to Marine aviation’s force structure. The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are part of the Corps’ Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) are so important in today’s offensive and defensive warfare because the ISR they provide is critical in shaping success on the modern battlefield. The main Marine Corps UAVs used today are the RQ-21 Black Jack and the MQ-9 Reaper. These systems may be adequate today but are old technology, not state of the art and can’t survive on a battlefield where the enemy has an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The Corps has vision for many new UAS capabilities but the two present systems are manpower intensive because they require launching, in flight and recovery crews. The MQ-9 is actually controlled by civilian contractors overseas today but that will change soon. One problem in the VMU community is officer retention as the USAF pays their UAV controllers flight pay and a hefty $35,000 annual bonus for a 3 to 12 year contract while civilian contractors offer large six figure salaries for qualified former military UAS operators. A major problem is that the Corps has put so much trust in future UAS capabilities that it has cost the divestment of 228 combat aircraft (84 F-35B, 48 MV-22, 36 CH-53Ks and 60 AH-1Zs and UH1Ys). This is a tremendous warfighting loss for Marine aviation and the supported MAGTF’s. These numbers are taken from the 2020 Marine Aviation Plan relating to aviation force structure. No Marine aviation training squadron aircraft are counted, nor are aircraft from the Marine Reserve aviation squadrons, nor VMX -1. Marine Wing Support Group’s (MWSG’s) Force Design 2030 deletes three MWSG’s Headquarters’ staffs that aren’t required and the Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) should be assigned to a Marine Air Group. Summary; Force Design 2030 greatly reduces Marine aviation’s combat capability. The Corps has three of the best military aircraft in the world for their respective missions: the F-35B/C, the MV-22 and the CH-53K. Relying on one strategy for the Indo/Pacific region is really limiting the Corps warfighting capabilities as future hostilities could involve requiring tasking all the way up to using a task organized MEF type force with all the combat capability that it offers. The F-35B/C must be used smartly as it can do many missions faster, safer, stealthier (undetected), hit targets far away from Marine ground forces and at the same time conduct ISR and take control of cruise missiles shot from great distances, continue guiding them to the target, change the target or make the missile capable of hitting a moving target like a ship. Basing Marines on close in island chains in the South of East China Sea to fire the artillery rockets and missiles would put them in great danger of being hit by the enemy’s missiles and suffer needless casualties. Using an F-35B/C for a mission like that is why the Corps bought this standoff, stealthy capability. All changes in Marine aviation force structure must come from the expertise at MAWTS-1, VMX-1, the Warfighting Lab and Deputy CMC, Aviation as it divests 228 aircraft out of an active duty force structure of 875 aircraft or 26% of the ACE’s warfighting capability. COME TO FIGHT...COME TO WIN Conclusion The Fleet Marine Force structure should not be based upon one specific enemy in one specific situation, in one specific location. The overall impact on the Fleet Marine Force will be a structure too weakened and too poorly organized and trained to serve as the nation’s “force in readiness.” It is not a question of “a new beginning or the end?” It may very well be, “the beginning of the end.” J.D. Lynch, Jr. Michael “Lancer” Sullivan Major General USMC (Ret) Major General USMC (Ret)
FOOTNOTES (1)War on the Rocks publication interview of General Berger dated 6 April 2020 (pp 1 and 2) (2)Naval Warfare, Pentagon publication by Paul Mcleary dated 3 April 2020 (p1) (3)Voice of Europe article of 27 April 2020 (4)War on the Rocks interview cited above, (p4) (5) Wall Street Journal Editorial, “Deterring China on a Coronavirus Budget,” dated 11 April 2020. War on the Rocks publication, “Don’t Go Too Crazy, Marine Corps” by Mark Cancian dated 8 January 2020. (6) War on the Rocks interview of General Berger dated 6 April 2020(p5) (7) The National Interest publication, “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps by Jim Webb, 8 May 2020 (8)Asia Times, “China could soon sink US in South China Sea,” Grant Newsome, 23 April 2020, (p5) (9) Ibid,p.3 (10) War on the Rocks, Berger interview cited above, p.5
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