ANNEX G-9

Marine Corps Special Landing Force Operations

The Republic of South Vietnam: 1965 to 1970

The Marine Corps’ ground forces introduction into the Republic of South Vietnam was across the beach. Helicopters were flown into Vietnam’s Da Nang air field from amphibious shipping and on March 9^th personnel and equipment were landed over Red Beach, Da Nang for further deployment to adjacent sites. While, as it turned out, these were incursions were unopposed, administrative landings, the planning for them was conducted under the strict guidance provided in NWP-22B which contained the doctrine covering the planning for and conduct of all Navy/Marine Corps joint and combined amphibious operations.

Prior to (1960) and after the Vietnam War, the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet maintained the capability to influence across the beach land operations with its Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force (ARG/SLF). This was a strategic option maintained for the entire CINCPAC arena and not exclusive to the Vietnam. This consisted of a complement of amphibious shipping and a Marine Landing Force. The ships usually included an Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) examples of which include the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) and USS Princeton (LPH 5); a Landing ship Dock (LSD) examples of which included the USS Point Defiance (LSD 31) and USS Alamo LSD 33); and APA (Attack Personnel Transport Ship) examples of which included the USS Bexar (APA 237) and Talladega (APA 208).

Too few Marines – then or now – are familiar with the Amphibious Operations Doctrine spelled out in the NWP 22 series and its companion documents the FMFM 1-7, 2-7 and others. Or that much of what is found in today’s amphibious doctrine is the result of amphibious operations during the Vietnam War where dozens of operations were conducted against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese enemy.

Unless the Marine Corps wishes to find itself a subordinate organization of the U.S. Army, we must not merely maintain but continually refine our ability to introduce combat force from the sea. During the Vietnam War, through the innovation and professional creativeness of the Navy/Marine Corps Team, it exploited its unique capability within the parameters of that the war in ways and by means not detailed in the Amphibious Operations Doctrine of that time. For example, the drafters of the original doctrine nor the subsequent revisioners had no idea the an amphibious operation would launched in an environment where U.S. military was already present and required prior coordination or that desires of friendly government and the military commanders ashore requires coordination and consideration.

In this paper I would like to review the Vietnam War through our “amphibious eyes”. In the early years of the war Hilgartner wrote “Many Marine officers of the 1960s appear totally unfamiliar not only with the (amphibious) doctrine but also with the execution of amphibious operations.” The bulk of the 2 Marine Divisions and one Air Wing were involved with prosecuting a land battle against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regular forces – in many case fighting the same war and in the same way with the same tactics using the same weapons often along side the U.S. Army. In spite of the Marine Corps total immersion in an extended land battle, there were a large number of amphibious operations. Wile these operations often met with only checkered success and were of little consequence in view of the larger war, they were not without inestimable value in maintaining amphibious doctrine and training.

The concepts and doctrine used for amphibious operations in Vietnam were basically those adopted and refined as a result of the WWII island hopping operations. The Korean War did not highlight any unique situations which challenged the established amphibious doctrine. However, Vietnam posed a quite different picture. The situation posed in Vietnam in 1965 was unique. For one, the enemy was not in total control of South Vietnam. And, while the enemy may have had control of parts of the country, those may not have included the area of the amphibious operation. “Semi-hostile” described the environment in many of the Marine’s Special Landing Force operations. Additionally, COMUSMACV was established ashore and was most interested in the operations of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet operations. In fact sorting out the command and control aspects of the Special Landing Force were a source of many difficulties between and among senior U.S. commanders – Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army – as well at the highest of civilian authority.

After much discussion CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV spelled out their agreement officially entitled “Agreement for U.S. Naval Support Operations in RVN”. This agreement had significant impact on the amphibious doctrine contained in NWP-22B. A number of studies resulting from this agreement addressed command relations and methods of employment of amphibious forces in Vietnam. The agreement and the follow-on studies, much of them based on the Vietnam experience of the Marine’s Special Landing Force, eventually led to today’s JCS Pub 302 which encompasses the former NWP-22-B and LFM-01.

The Special Landing Force comprises a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and a Medium Helicopter Squadron. The BLT was – and is - “super-sized” organic infantry battalion task organized to contain combat, combat support, and combat service support elements. Initially, the more senior LtCol commander of the ground or air components was also the SLF commander. In time, a full colonel was assigned to the SLF as its commander to which both the ground and air organizations reported. The SLF was staffed much like - but somewhat smaller than - that of an infantry regiment. Of note is that, at one point, there was created a second SLF to meet both the mission requirements of the Seventh Fleet and that demanded by support of the prossecuion of the Vietnam War.

From the standpoint of landing forces in support of the Vietnam War, 4 hybrids evolved.

1. An amphibious operation in which the landing force was composed of all FMF, SEVENTHFLT

forces. A principal example of the SEVENTHFLT Marine units had been the Special Landing Force (SLF), which was part of the Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB) based in Okinawa (see figure 1) . Operation DECKHOUSE ONE, conducted in June 1966, is an example of this type. BEAU CHARGER, conducted in May 1967 is another.

2. An amphibious operation which is a part of an in-country operation (see figure 2). In some operations conducted by the III MAF, forces were not embarked, and the entire amphibious operation was executed by designated FMF, SEVENTHFLT Marine forces. In these situations, it was not unusual for the amphibious operation to be terminated and for operational control of the landing force to be chopped to the in-country commander until the operation was over . Upon conclusion of these in-country operations, it was normal for the amphibious operation to be resumed for the purpose of withdrawing the landing force. As an example, the SLF reported to OPCON of CG, III MAF under these conditions during Operation BEAVER TRACK in July 1967, and returned to OPCON of the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) when the support requirement ceased . This type was probably the most common.

3. An amphibious operation in which both in-country forces (i .e., III MAF) and FMF, SEVENTHFLT forces were embarked in amphibious task force shipping (see figure 3) . Normally, the landing forces came from a single Marine command and were organized from a command standpoint to execute amphibious operations. Again the situation in the Western Pacific was unique, because there were FMF, SEVENTHFLT Marine forces and III Marine Amphibious Forces, who upon occasion have been combined to form the landing force. One example occurred in Operation DOUBLE EAGLE in January-February1966.

4. An amphibious operation in which the landing force was composed entirely of in-country (i .e ., III MAF) forces (see figure 4) . Operation BLUE MARLIN, which took place in November 1965, is an example of this type of operation. With the creation of a second ARG/SLF in April 1967 the requirement for this type operation had been materially reduced .

That there are four types of amphibious operations which can be conducted in a semi-hostile environment such as South Vietnam may be considered academic to some, but knowledge of same is important to an appreciation of the impact this war and the CINCPACFLT/COMUSMACV Agreement have had on naval amphibious doctrine. In conducting these amphibious operations some exceptions or deviations are applied to the amphibious doctrine contained in NWP-22B. For the most part the deviations have been related to the command and control authority of the CATF within the objective area. Amphibious objective areas in conventional WWII type amphibious operations tended to be described in terms of a geometric cylinder giving wide latitude in terms of land, sea, and airspace .However, as has been stated, South Vietnam has presented a different situation . Friendly forces and civilians are almost always in the vicinity of the planned assault objective (s) . Notification to civilian aircraft agencies that a specified air space along their normal flight route will be restricted to aircraft on certain days might jeopardize the security of the operation. The AOA can be scribed so that nearby friendly ground forces are excluded. A tunnel through the air space of sufficient cube to permit uninterrupted flight by other friendly aircraft is often included. But even in the face of all of this, the doctrine for amphibious operations as contained in NWP-22B/LFM-01* had proved adequate. But the situation in South Vietnam has produced some new facets affecting the doctrine which are important to Marines.

Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces operations can be grouped into 3 categories for purposes of this paper:

1. “Dagger Thrust” operations, of which there were 5, conducted in 1965, early-on in the Vietnam War.

2. “Deckhouse” operations, of which there were 6, conducted 1966-1967

3. And participation in many of the named operations conducted throughout the Vietnam War starting before the implementation of Dagger Thrust Operations (eg., Operation Starlite) and continuing after the cessation of Deckhouse Operations (eg., .

During late May of 1965 the SLF was dissolved due to shipping requirements to land the 3d MAB at Chu Lai. This was recognized as a purely temporary situation. Discussions were around the creation of a reconstituted SLF that would be configured to conduct amphibious raids along the coast of Vietnam targeting VC/NVA infiltration and marshalling points. MACV and CinCPacFleet agreed that initial operations would be conducted across unopposed beaches and into unpopulated areas. The 2 commands agreed to the reconstituted SLF but Westmorland’s idea was that the raids would be conducted by RVN ground units. The fact that the ground units were in short supply – both in numbers and training and that Krulak and CinCPacFleet did not agree with MACV resulted in the SLF ground operations being conducted by U.S. ground forces i.e., the Marines.

On 19 June 1965, FMFPac reactivated the Marine landing force for planning purposes. It comprised BLT 3/7 commanded by LtCol C.H. Bodley just arrived from Camp Pendleton and HMM-163 commanded by LtCol N.G. Ewers just arrived from its previous deployment to Da Nang. On 24 June Task Force 76.6, commanded by Capt. D.A. Scott, USN, sailed from Buckner Bay, Okinawa embarked in USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2), USS Point Defiance (LSD 31), and USS Talladega (APA 208) for South Vietnam.

With considerable active in II Corps during May and June, concern of an enemy offensive against the U.S. Army’s large logistic facilities at Qui Nhon resulted in the administrative landing of LtCol Bodley’s 3/7. Elements of BLT 3/7 remained ashore for 6 days until relieved by LtCol Leon Utter’s 2/7. 3/7 back-loaded but remained just off shore. On 20 July with all elements of the ARG/SLF loaded, it sailed for Subic Bay, P.I.

It should be noted that 3/7’s tank platoon’s tanks were not landed at Qui Nhon. However, most of its personnel were landed armed with their .45 cal. “grease guns” and semi-automatic pistols dug into fox holes in a formidable perimeter defense with the ability to stop and enemy assault at about 25 yards in front of our positions. This unique employment of a Marine Tank Platoon was matched later in Operation Starlite.

A number of re-alignments of authority for training and employing of ARG assets severely tested the authority of both USN and USMC commanders. The concern that the Navy’s employment of Marine units in other than non-amphibious purposes would be detrimental to the Marine’s mission. That concern was borne out when the ARG was diverted to Pratas Reef to rescue the USS Frank Knox (DD 42) which had run aground there. The ARG was split up, sending the Talladega and Iwo Jima to Hong Kong for liberty and the Point Defiance to Subic Bay to off-load some of its BLT combat equipment – tanks and Ontos – to make room for salvage equipment. When the ARG was called to support Operation Starlite it arrived without the equipment off-loaded in P.I. i.e., most of its tanks and other supporting arms.

After Operation Starlite, concerns about this convolution of the SLF employment in the involuntary diversion to support the salvage operations of the Frank Knox caused a re-study of command arrangements of the ARG/BLT to obviate a re-occurrence of similar incidents. Admirals argued with Marine Generals – often bitter – over who commanded what and under what circumstances. The doctrine that stated the more senior of the Marine air and ground elements was the overall SLF commander was challenged. An argument was made that there be a colonel in command to the 2 elements to which each of the air/ground commanders (LtCols) would report and who, with a separate staff, would coordinate the efforts of both.

While these arguments raged and messages flashed, the SLF composition was undergoing change. LtCol Bodley’s BLT 3/7 was offloaded at Chu Lai to join its parent unit the 7^th Marines and attached to III MAF in early September. The ARG departed for Okinawa and embarked the new SLF BLT 2/1 commanded by LtCol R.T.Hanifin, retaining HMM 163 as the helicopter squadron commanded by LtCol Ewers who remained C.O. of the squadron and also the SLF. On 10 September the ARG/SLF was off shore Vietnam as the covering force of the U.S. Army’s 1^st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) at Qui Nhon.

* NWP-22-B/LFM-01 has been superseded by JCS Pub 3-02

Edited for publication in Foundation’s “Marine Corps Tanks and Ontos in the Vietnam War”