ANNEX G-16

Excerpts from the Pentagon Papers

By J. Powers

To view several takes on the Pentagon Papers go to https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=pentagon+papers

Here are Twelve Things that the editor of this publication learned from reading the Pentagon Papers.

(MCVTHF: Note that Powers’ observations, ergo the following, are disputable and offered here as just one of the numerous “take aways”)

1) During colonialism, the French divided Vietnam into three distinct areas: Tonkin (north); Annam (central); and Cochinchina (south).

2) The French government betrayed the Vietnamese in 1946 by not fulfilling their agreement to allow Tonkin to become a free, independent state, albeit within the French union.

3) The United States became directly involved in the war in Vietnam in 1949.

4) The United States funded about 80% of the French war expense.

5) The United States held that Vietnam must be preserved for the free world against Communism otherwise there would be a “domino effect” furthering the loss of other Asian nations. This theory was quietly abandoned by the U.S. after the Geneva conference

6) The Geneva conference of 1954 created not two separate countries (North Vietnam and South Vietnam), but rather two “zones” that were to be united through elections in 1956. The French, and other international powers, betrayed the Vietnamese by not ensuring that these elections occur.

7) Nearly one million Vietnamese relocated to the southern zone of Vietnam following the Geneva conference, many of them Catholics who comprised an elite class in a largely Buddhist country.

8) There were powerful sects in South Vietnam with religious-political-military allegiances that over-rode national identity.

9) The United States considered sending combat troops to shore up the Saigon government as early as 1961.

10) There were many high-level U.S. officials arguing against direct American involvement in Vietnam in 1965. Their warnings were out-weighed by the arguments of competing officials.

11) The U.S. bombing strategy over North Vietnam grew to be conducted almost without limits, and yet it was determined to be costly and ineffective.

12) The person who is President makes a monumental difference. If Franklin Roosevelt had lived longer, it is likely he would have resisted France’s desire to reestablish its colonial power over Indochina. His successor Harry Truman had no such qualms with French aims. Also, while John Kennedy was agreeable to advisors, military assistance, and covert operations, he was unlikely to ever send combat troops or carry out aerial bombing over North Vietnam, unlike Lyndon Johnson

Chapter 23 Game of Points

U.S. lays out a new plan early in March, the Chief of Staff of the Army evaluated the need for added supporting actions in Vietnam. His party was briefed by Ambassador Taylor who observed the basic unresolved problem as the provision of adequate security for the population. Inability to suppress the insurgency was considered largely the consequence of insufficient trained paramilitary and police manpower. Secondly, South Vietnam's open frontiers could not be sealed against infiltration. Thirdly, counterinsurgency was plagued by popular apathy and dwindling morale, some the consequences of a long and seemingly endless war. On March 8, 1965, the first two Marine battalions landed at Danang. Almost all of the intelligence reports during that month indicated our programs in Vietnam were either stalemated or failing. Not only was South Vietnam's armed forces strength considerably below the goals set and agreed upon, it was in considerable danger of actually decreasing. Once again, Taylor returned to Washington for policy conferences. In the National Security Council meeting of April 1, President Johnson gave his formal approval, to a 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Taylor. The President further approved the urgent exploration of the covert actions proposed by the Director of Central Intelligence. And] finally, he repeated his previous approval of the 21-point program of military actions recommended by the Army Chief of Staff. The President also authorized the 18,000 to 20,000-man increase in U.S. military support forces, the deployment of two additional Marine battalions, and the change of mission for all Marine battalions to permit their use in active combat. This approval became National Security Action Memorandum 328."

1968 TET Offensive

In January 1967, another effort to communicate positions with North Vietnam had been made, and there was an understandable desire to defer escalatory decisions until it had been determined whether some possibility for negotiations existed. Moreover, the Tet holiday, for which a truce had been announced, made late January an unpropitious time to expand the bombing. U.S. Army commander, Gen. William Westmoreland had strongly recommended against a truce for Tet because of the losses to friendly forces during the Christmas and New Year's truces just concluded. The factor which eventually forced the President's hand was the unprecedented North Vietnamese resupply activity during the Tet bombing suspension. By the time the truce had been in effect 24 hours, surveillance revealed the massive North Vietnamese effort to move supplies south. The President perceived the strikes as necessary in the psychological test of wills between the two sides to punish the North, in spite of the near- consensus opinion of his advisers that no level of damage or destruction that we were willing to inflict was likely to destroy Hanoi's determination to continue the struggle. To learn more about North Vietnam’s resupply efforts go to

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viet_Cong_and_Vietnam_People's_Army_logistics_and_equipment

As planned, the Allies began a 36-hour truce in honor of the Tet holidays on January 29. The order was shortly canceled, however, because of fierce enemy attacks in the northern provinces. Then, suddenly on January 31, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces launched massive assaults on virtually every major city and provincial capital, and most of the military installations in South Vietnam. In Saigon, attackers penetrated the new American Embassy and the Palace grounds before they were driven back. Whole sections of the city were under Viet Cong control temporarily. In Hue, an attacking force captured virtually the entire city. Everywhere the fighting was intense and the casualties, civilian as well as military, were staggering. Coming on the heels of optimistic reports from the field commands, this offensive stunned both the Administration and the American public. To a view a report on the Tet Offensive, go to http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1vJqTN-qVI"